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ABSTRACT
This dissertation encompasses three chapters that study the Brazilian higher edu-
cational system and determines the barriers to acquiring higher education in the country.
Below are the individual abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1: Rural and urban schools’ performance in Brazil and its impact on access to
higher education
Recent research on academic achievement in Brazil shows that public school students
face strong barriers in gaining access to higher education compared to private school students.
However, little is known about differences between public schools located in urban and rural
areas, another source of opportunity inequality. I estimate the effectiveness of rural and
urban schools in Brazil using data from a major university entrance exam. To account for
bias in Ordinary Least Square (OLS), I use a technique recently developed by Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005b) that estimates the ratio of the influence of omitted variables relative to
observed variables that would be required to completely explain the estimates one obtains via
OLS. The results indicate that students from urban areas outperform their rural counterparts
and provide suggestive evidence that the poor quality of rural public schools is the source of
such score differences.
Chapter 2: Climbing the Educational Ladder: The Relative Performance of Rural and
Urban Students in Brazilian Universities
Recent research on academic achievement in Brazil shows that rural school students
face strong barriers in gaining access to higher education compared to urban school students.
However, little is known about differences between rural and urban students when they
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are granted access to the university. We estimate the relative performance of rural and
urban students in Brazil using data from a major university. Furthermore, to observe how
performance varies along the different GPA quantiles, we use Koenker and Bassett (1978)
quantile regression approach. The results indicate that students from rural areas outperform
their urban counterparts providing suggestive evidence that using policed implementations
that increase rural acceptance rates would decrease regional educational inequalities and
help fight the high income inequality rates observed in the Brazilian society.
Chapter 3: College Dropouts and Entrance Test Scores: A Censored Quantile Regression
Approach
The problem of university dropouts has generated increased interest among researchers,
policymakers, and educators in recent years. This paper examines the many issues involved
in trying to understand and solve this complex social and educational problem. Using a
dataset from students enrolled in a Brazilian major university, we estimate the effect of
student entrance exam performance on dropout rates using a censored quantile regression
approach proposed by Portnoy (2003). We find that students with higher entrance exam
scores are more likely to dropout of college in the beginning of their college journey while
being less likely to dropout after some time. Such results are likely due to the perception
that a high ability student has over his probabilities of entering a more difficult or better
major the following year.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Brazilian educational system has had impressive growth rates in recent years, espe-
cially its higher educational institutions. Despite its high growth rates, only 10% of Brazil-
ians aged between 25 and 64 are reported as having at least some college education. This
is rather low compared to countries such as the U.S., where 39% of the population of the
same age group report having some college education. Also, according to the World Bank,
Brazil is ranked among those countries where inequality is among the highest in the world
(World Bank, 2007). Understanding the role played by education and how could it reduce
the high income inequality rates in the country becomes an important question when offering
solutions that help mitigate this constant problem.
In this dissertation, I examine rural and urban students at the whole spectrum of the
Brazilian educational system. My main motivation comes from the fact that rural areas
in Brazil are much more underdeveloped when compared to urbanized areas, specially in
northeastern Brazil. Thus, educational opportunities for rural and urban students might
play an important role in perpetuating equality and contributing the low intergenerational
social mobility. I use a dataset from students’ entrance test scores at the Universidade Federal
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de Pernambuco (UFPE), a major university that is located in the Northeast of Brazil.
In order to give a complete picture of the different stages of the educational ladder in
Brazil, I begin by analyzing those students that are applying to the university in order to
be granted access for the higher educational system. Next, I follow those students who
succeeded in entering the higher educational system and I observe their performance while
in the university. Lastly, I discuss the high dropout rates that these students encounter while
in the course of their college degree. The main goal is to identify and propose different ways
that could help decrease inequality of opportunity in all levels on the Brazilian educational
system and increase the overall quality of Brazilian education.
In the first essay, I consider students who are finishing or have finished high school and
are applying to the higher education institution. In order to be granted access to a public
university in Brazil all candidates must take an entrance exam. Only the best candidates
(who are ranked among the top scores) are granted access to pursue a college degree. I test
whether students coming from rural areas face bigger barriers to enter the university and
obtain a higher education degree. Also, I examine the sources of possible differences in exam
performance between rural and urban students. I provide evidence that students coming
from rural areas underperform their urban counterparts in the entrance exam, thus, facing
bigger barriers to acquire a higher education. The main factor of their poor performance is
the low quality of the rural public schools that they study in.
In the second essay, I follow those students that have successfully entered the university
and are enrolled in their specific major. I then test whether the disadvantages faced by the
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rural students on the entrance exam remain by negatively affecting their GPA once they are
in college. A discussion about the income distribution of those entering the university and
about which major each student applies to is also presented. It is important to consider rural
and urban students by college majors since differences in occupation might be an important
source of income inequality. Results indicate that the rural students are able to overcome
their entrance disadvantages as they have higher GPA (specially for the lowest competitive
majors) compared to their urban counterparts, on average. The underlying reason behind
these findings is that the rural students that enter the university are endowed with high
pre-college ability levels.
Finally, in the third essay I discuss the high dropout rates observed in Brazilian universi-
ties. I observe students throughout the course of their college degree until they graduate or
take the decision to drop out of the university to determine the relationship of their entrance
exam scores and its predictive power on the probability of college dropout. The results
obtained show that a better performance on the entrance exam is correlated with a posi-
tive increase in the probability of college dropout for the earlier quantiles, but significantly
decreases dropout probabilities for the later quantiles. The intuition behind the observed
high dropout probabilities following high entrance exam performance arises from the fact
that high ability students, given the recognition of a wrong career choice, have a lower cost
implicitly defined by their higher probability of being accepted for a different major on next
years’ exam.
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Chapter 2
Rural and urban schools’ performance
in Brazil and its impact on access to
higher education
2.1 Introduction
According to the World Bank, inequality in Brazil is among the highest in the world (World
Bank, 2007). Ferreira and Veloso (2006) and Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Mene´ndez (2007)
present evidence of a persistent inequality of opportunity in Brazil and intergenerational
social mobility being among the lowest compared to international standards. A natural
question is what are the factors responsible for such high inequality rates. An explanation is
the role played by education and how differences in school quality among regions may affect
inequality and growth. In this paper, I discuss certain differences between urban and rural
schools in Brazil and analyze whether these differences determine opportunities for higher
education.
The Brazilian primary, secondary and higher education system is composed of private
and public schools. There is no fee for studying in a public school or university, however, high
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fees exist for those attending private schools and private universities. At the primary and
secondary level, private schools are generally superior when compared to public schools, but
Brazilian public universities are generally better. Therefore, students coming from wealthier
families are more likely to study in private primary and secondary schools. As a consequence
and given the main requirement to be accepted for higher education is a very competitive
entrance exam, high income families are more likely place their children in good public
universities (Cavalcanti et al., 2010). As shown by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Fernandes and
Menezes Filho (2000), for each additional year of education acquired at the university, there
is a wage increase of 20% on average. Hence, it appears that the Brazilian educational system
fosters persistent inequality, in part because students from more favored environments are
more likely to acquire higher levels of education and wages. A recent study from the An´ısio
Teixeira National Institute for Educational Research and Studies (Inep)1 found that, among
students in the primary and secondary education system, 42% were described as performing
“very poorly” and “poorly” on schooling outcomes. Further, when analyzing those with
“very poor” performance, Inep reports that 96% were educated in public schools. These
raw score differences, however, reflect differences in family characteristics, such as parents’
education and income, among others. Accounting for theses differences, Cavalcanti et al.,
estimates that public school students score about 7% lower when compared to students who
studied in private schools. Also, Inep shows that rural school students generally perform
worse than their urban counterparts. Hence, combining these findings with the fact that
1Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais An´ısio Teixeira. The Inep is an agency directly
linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Education whose goal is to promote research and evaluation of the
Brazilian educational system.
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rural areas in Brazil often have worse schooling systems, it is crucial to understand and to
quantify the extra burden placed on those coming from less favored regions.
In recent years, there has been increasing concern as to how higher education could reach
rural students. The federal government recently has launched a program whose main purpose
was to build several university campuses in rural areas. This would allow more students to
enter higher education and benefit from its high returns, especially those students that
otherwise would not have the opportunity to study in a urban area. However, note that this
is only a partial solution because this program does not improve the quality of the primary
and secondary public schools in the rural areas. Since the evidence points to public school
students performing worse than private school students and that rural areas have higher
concentration of public schools, federal programs such as this one are not likely to benefit
the less aﬄuent rural students attending public primary and secondary schools.
The purpose of this paper is to look at differences in performance between students
coming from rural and urban areas in Brazil.2 In addition to the barriers faced by students
attending the public primary and secondary school system, another source of inequality is
faced by those coming from rural areas. Hence, it is crucial to understand what are the
barriers faced by rural students in acquiring access to higher education and what policies
might be implemented in order to achieve a more egalitarian society. Addressing these
problems is critical in order to understand how the government should formulate its policy
so that all students have the same opportunity, independent of family background, school
2An urban area is characterized by higher population density and vast human features in comparison
to areas surrounding it. Urban areas may be cities, towns or conurbations, but the term is not commonly
extended to rural settlements such as villages and hamlets.
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characteristics, and geographical location.
In order to analyze the performance of urban and rural students, I use a data set on
entrance test scores from a major public university in Brazil. The data contain detailed
information on students’ background (which includes parents’ education, family income,
whether the students have access to the internet, among many others), school characteristics
(for example, whether the student had lab and English classes) as well as information about
which school the student was enrolled in when graduating from high school. Hence, I use
regression methods to identify the effects of rural and urban schooling on test scores. As
is well known, in such regression models, controlling for variables that affect test scores
is extremely important to isolate the true effect one is interested in. For that, I use a
variety of background variables to control for confounding factors that might compromise
the simple raw score comparison between urban and rural students. However, one may still
argue that the existence of omitted variables might introduce several biases when comparing
students living in different areas, i.e., can I correctly estimate the parameter of interest
only by controlling for individual and family background characteristics or there are other
unobservable variables, correlated with the region of residence, that also determine test
scores? To address this issue, I use a recently developed technique proposed by Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005b) in which one may assess the potential size of the bias due to
unobserved factors.
I find that students coming from urban public schools score on average 0.074 standard
deviations above their rural counterparts. If such difference ware to be eliminated by any
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means and holding all other characteristics constant, rural students admittance to the uni-
versity would have increased by 13.34%, thus, significantly increasing their acceptance rates
to the university. Furthermore, I find suggestive evidence that the difference in students
scores arises because of low rural primary and secondary school quality. Lastly, I show that
attending private tutoring classes and taking multiple tests might benefit students in entering
the higher education system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the estimation strategy
used in the paper. Section 2.3 presents the data and summary statistics for rural and urban
students in Brazil. Results are presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Estimation Strategy
The paper estimates the effectiveness of public schools located in rural and urban areas
in Brazil. To capture these differences I estimate the following model:
scoresi = β0 + β1 · urbani + β ′2 ·Xi + εi, (2.1)
where scoresi is the standardized test score for student i, urbani is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the student is enrolled in a urban school and 0 otherwise and Xi is a vector of family
and students background characteristics. β1 is the parameter of interest and represents the
effect of studying in an urban school on performance. I define urban school students as those
studying in an metropolitan region.3 In section 2.4.1, I show that my results are robust to
3The Brazilian official definition of a metropolitan region includes a large central city and the municipality
where its located, as well as surrounding municipalities, thus, forming a large urban conglomerate.
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the definition of the variable urban. I define urban school students as those studying in areas
with certain degrees of population density.
To correctly estimate β1 one needs a clear identification strategy to account for unobserv-
able variables. For example, Angrist et al. (2002) use a randomized natural experiment in
Colombia, in which students are randomly selected to receive a voucher that covers the cost
of private secondary schooling, to analyze the benefits of studying in a private school. In the
absence of randomized experiments, the ideal setting, researchers have proposed the use of
several instrumental variables to identify schooling effects. For example, Evans and Schwab
(1995), looking at differences between Catholic and public schools, use a dummy variable for
affiliation with the Catholic church to instrument for enrolling in a Catholic school. Simi-
larly, Neal (1997) use proxies for geographic proximity to Catholic schools and subsidies for
Catholic schools as exogenous variation in Catholic high school attendance. However, serious
concerns about the exogeneity of these instruments have been raised by Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005a). Among these concerns, they argue that affiliation with the Catholic church
might be correlated to family and neighborhood characteristics which affect school effective-
ness. Also, migration patterns may change the composition of Catholics and non-Catholics
in the correlation from school distance and various background characteristics. In such case,
geographic proximity to Catholic schools can not be treated exogenously.
In the analysis carried out in the present paper, there is no random assignment as well as
no instruments that correctly identify the parameter of interest. Rather, I use a technique
recently developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b) to investigate the potential size
of any bias due to unobservable variables in the estimated coefficient of interest (β1). In
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their paper they propose the idea that “selection on observables is the same as selection on
unobservables”, which is equivalent to the condition that Cov(ε,urban)
V ar(ε)
= Cov(β2X,urban)
V ar(β2X)
, where
X is a vector of observable characteristics, and ε is the error term potentially correlated
with urban. This is a valid procedure when point estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of
additional control variables. Sensitivity to inclusion of additional control variables is often
argued to measure the exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Since selection bias due to
unobserved variables will be accessed through observed characteristics, it is important that
these covariates are exogenously determined. This corresponds to our case, since when stu-
dent and school characteristics and family background variables are included, the estimated
coefficient of the variable urban decreases in magnitude.
2.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper comes from students’ entrance test scores at the Universi-
dade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), a major university that is located in the Northeast of
Brazil. UFPE is a public university that charges no tuition fees, and the main requirement
for entering the universities’ undergraduate programs is an entrance exam that must be
taken by all candidates. The exam consists of two rounds where the students are required to
choose their major before the first round. All candidates are required to take the following
subjects in the first round: Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Foreign Language, Chemistry,
Geography, Literature, History and Portuguese. The second round is taken only by those
students who scored a minimum required to pass in the first round. Final acceptance for
higher education depends not only on the final score obtained by the student, but also on
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which major the student applied for. That is, obtaining a score of 80% might guarantee
acceptance in the Engineering College but not in the College of Law, for example.
A socioeconomic questionnaire in the registration process provides rich and detailed in-
formation on the students’ family background, individual characteristics, and previous edu-
cation information, such as the type and the location of school attended in the primary and
secondary education system. The data include all candidates who took the exam in the year
of 2005, about 55,000.4 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all candidates applying
to the university. To better identify the effect of interest, I impose some restrictions in the
sample. First, I consider only students living in the state of Pernambuco, given students
coming from other states are likely to be a very selective group, and there is no information
about which high school they graduated from. These students are likely to come from the
top of the income distribution because they face higher costs of going to another state to
take the exam, may be highly motivated to enter the university and are likely to be applying
to highly competitive majors. Furthermore, students coming from out of state represent only
1.98% of all applicants. Secondly, I remove all students enrolled in a private school, given
the focus of the paper is on measuring differences between urban and rural public schools.
Finally, I do not include students who graduated from high school via the supletivo method
as well as all students taking the exam as a mock exam. The supletivo method is offered
by the Ministry of Education as an alternative education method for those individuals who
had either dropped off or did not have the chance to go to school at school age or have large
4In the year of 2005, out of the 55,000 students who took the entrance exam, about 5,000 ware granted
access to the university.
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age/grade distortions. It is very similar to the General Educational Development (GED)
certification studied by Heckman and LaFontaine (2007).
2.3.1 Characteristics of Urban and Rural Students
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for public school students in urban and rural areas.
Urban students have substantially higher scores compared to rural students, with a score
difference of about 0.103 standard deviation (σ), on average. This represents a significant
advantage for urban students taking the exam. For example, if I increase the score of the
rural students by 0.103 standard deviations and looking at the entrance cutoff score of each
major, the acceptance rate of rural applicants to the university would have increased by
20.29%. This difference, as explained above, does not reflect the true urban school effect, or
the true difference between schools located in urban and rural areas, given students living
in urban/rural areas are different in many observable and unobservable dimensions.
One can also observe that those students located in rural areas are usually younger and
work on average 24% fewer hours compared to their urban counterparts. This is rather sur-
prising because rural areas usually have lower income and education levels forcing students to
work at earlier ages and postponing school entrance. Also students living in rural areas have
more educated mothers when compared to those coming from urban areas. The selectivity
characteristic of the entrance exam may explain such strange results. Rural students taking
the exam are usually top students who come from wealthier and more educated families
within rural areas. Hence, given that the sample of rural students actually taking the exam
come from the top of the distribution of parents’ education and income, and thus are more
12
likely to have a better academic achievement when compared to the whole population of
rural students, my estimates presented below are likely to be a lower bound coefficient from
rural schools performance.
Most of the students in the sample report themselves as whites. With regard to income
levels, even with a highly selective sample, students from urban areas come from generally
wealthier families. Those coming from urban areas are more likely to have access to internet,
on average 38% more, but to have fewer laboratory classes in their schools. They are also
more likely to have studied a foreign language intensively. On the other hand, students
coming from rural areas are more likely to have a daily reading habit (on average 5% more)
then their urban counterparts.
Due to high selection problems present in the UFPE data, I present summary statistics
from another dataset in an attempt to better characterize urban and rural students in Brazil.
The data come from the National Basic Educational Evaluation System (SAEB)5, which is
a biennial standardized exam randomly taken by students in Brazil. The sample consists
of fourth grade students in primary schools enrolled in the year of 2005. Table 2.3 presents
summary statistics.
As can be observed, results change completely when compared to the selective sample.
Rural students are now older and work on average 45% more than their urban counterparts.
Mothers’ education levels are now lower amongst rural students and higher for students in
5Sistema Nacional de Avaliac¸a˜o da Educac¸a˜o Ba´sica. The SAEB is a program created by Inep to
evaluate the basic educational system in Brazil. It was introduced to monitor the whole educational system
and focuses on examining the student’s performance on standardized tests in order to observe the quality of
teaching being received by the students.
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urban areas. One can also observe a dramatic increase in internet usage for urban students.
They use 71% more internet than rural students on average. Lastly, reading habits are still
higher for rural students. They read on average 23% more than urban students.
The SAEB dataset provides a better understanding of the differences between urban
and rural students. Since the students are randomly selected in the evaluation process, the
SAEB data better characterizes urban and rural students characteristics and it highlights
the selection problems present in the UFPE dataset. It is, thus, important to remember
that differences between urban and rural areas will capture lower bound schooling effects
and that the actual differences between rural and urban areas can be much larger than the
ones found here.
2.4 Results
Table 2.4 presents estimates of the test score difference between rural and urban schools. I
consider several specifications in which controls for student characteristics, parents’ education
and income levels are sequentially introduced. All estimations are preformed via OLS. Robust
standard errors are presented in parenthesis and adjusted R squared reported in the end of
Table 2.4. Before describing each specification and its controls, it is important to note that
the coefficient of interest, β1, is positive and statistically significant across all equations.
In column 1, I begin with the simplest specification of all where no controls are included.
As shown, students from public urban schools score about 0.103σ higher than students from
public rural schools. However, as mentioned above, the absence of controls for student
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characteristics and parents’ education levels may confound the estimate, i.e., this gap might
be completely driven by differences in educational background not accounted for, leading to
wrong conclusions.
In columns 2 and 3 I include controls for student’s characteristics and parents’ education,
respectively. Among the variables included in column 2, age, gender, hours worked, race and
religion are significantly related to test scores. The age variable appears to be negatively
correlated with test scores, which is likely due to the fact that age of graduation has a
negative relationship to ability, given less able students are more likely to repeat grades (see
Sampaio et al. (2011)).6 Females perform worse than males, a result consolidated in the
literature and obtained in most gender studies (see, for example, Guiso et al. (2008)). With
respect to the effect of working on performance, there is no consensus in the literature on the
direction of this effect (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003)). I find here that working is
negatively related to test scores. The inclusion of students’ characteristics slightly decreases
the coefficient of urban schools. But, the inclusion of mother’s education leads to an increase
in the coefficient of interest. Such an increase is expected because rural students have mothers
with higher educational levels due to selection.
In column 4 family income is included as an additional covariate. This is an important
variables to control for, given income levels are known to vary significantly between urban
and rural areas of Brazil (specially in the northeast part of Brazil). Hence, one should
expect a significant decrease in the coefficient of interest given income is highly correlated to
6The problem of grade retention is a very pronounced fact in Brazil. In 2004, for the age cohort of 11 to
14, which should be enrolled in grades five to eight, 29% were still in grades one to four (Soares (2006); and
Arends-Kuenning (2009)).
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both urban and test score variables. This is exactly what is observed, i.e., income affecting
significantly test scores and the coefficient of interest decreasing from 0.123 to 0.116σ.
The specification in Column 5 includes the full set of controls. The additional variables
measure school and additional student characteristics. Observe that test scores differences
reduce to about 0.06σ, half the magnitude of the estimated coefficient in specification 4,
however still significant at a 99% confidence interval. The sample used so far contains all
students taking that exam under the restrictions described in section 2.3. However, given
there are about 5,000 spots available each year at UFPE and more than 50,000 candidates,
many students are not admitted and, if they desire to acquire higher education for free, they
must take the exam again in the following year. For example, about 25% of all students
applying for the university in 2005 had already taken an entrance exam in the past years.
Hence, in column 6 I repeat the estimation performed in column 5 but restricting the sample
to all students who are taking the exam for their first time. The reason for imposing such
restriction is that first and multiple time exam takers might be different in a number of
characteristics. For example, they might have different ability levels or be differently mo-
tivated to enter the university. Also, those taking the exam multiple times might not be
exogenously distributed across urban and rural areas. Thus, this restriction induces a more
homogeneous sample and a cleaner result. The coefficient, however, remains the same. I
take this specification as my preferred one given it uses the most complete sample given the
restrictions described above.
In column 7 I perform an additional estimation where I include the ENEM (National
Exam for High School students) exam scores as an additional covariate. The ENEM is a
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national exam that can be taken by all high school students and involves more general and
logical measures than the university entrance exam. As of 2005, the exam was completely
optional and not required to graduate nor to apply for higher education. Hence, only slightly
more than half of my sample decided to take the exam. This is likely to generate problems
given the students who decide to take this exam are not randomly selected from the pop-
ulation of all students graduating from high school. However, I find it useful to estimate a
model where ENEM scores are accounted for. As I described before, students coming from
rural areas are likely to be selected in terms of income and academic performance, which
implies that they probably compose the upper part of the rural score distribution. Hence,
by including a measure of “ability” in the equation, such as the ENEM exam, the coefficient
for the urban variable should increase if there is really a selection of the best rural students.
This is exactly what is observed, i.e., the coefficient increases from 0.069 to 0.093σ.
To show that rural students are a selected sample, I present a model where I reestimate
Table 2.4 using the ENEM scores as the dependent variable. One should expect to find no
differences in student’s test scores. Results are presented in Table 2.5.
As can be observed, almost all coefficients become statistically insignificant. It is impor-
tant to remember that in the year of 2005 the ENEM exam was completely optional and not
required to graduate nor to apply for higher education, therefore, only the most motivated
and better students were likely to take the exam.
Including ENEM scores as a control variable might seem to be a bad idea given it might
itself be an outcome variable. If ENEM scores were to affect decisions to live in urban or
in rural areas, including it as control would introduce selection bias to the coefficient of
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interest, reflecting the change in composition of students living in rural or in urban areas. If
ENEM scores do not influence residence decisions, which is likely to be the case, including
it as control for “ability” may still be an improvement on no control at all, even if affected
by the indicator variable of interest. Details regarding the effect of bad controls and proxy
controls are provided in Appendix A.
As discussed in section 2.2, one needs to investigate whether such differences in test scores
could arise due to omitted variables in the equation of interest. If unobserved characteristics
such as ability, effort level or motivation are not controlled for, then severe bias might harm
the coefficients estimated above.
The Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b) technique provides evidence that score differences
are not fully explained by omitted variables. The estimated bias for the specification in
Column 7 is presented in the last row of Table 2.4. The bias due to unobservable variables
is 0.019σ, suggesting that students’ test score differences are overestimated. Given the
estimated coefficient is 0.093σ and the bias introduced by omitted variables is 0.019σ, the
lower bound coefficient of the variable of interest becomes 0.074σ. This represents a huge
advantage. For example, when looking at the cutoff entrance score of all majors, increasing
rural students’ grades by 0.074 standard deviation would increase the number of public rural
students accepted to the university by 13.34%, consequently decreasing urban admittance
by the same amount.
Following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b), the bias from OLS is Cov(ε,ûrban)
V ar(ûrban)
, where hats
denote the residuals from a regression of urban on X, and can be assessed by the following
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equation:7
Cov(ε, ûrban)
V ar(ûrban)
=
Cov(ε, urban)
V ar(ûrban)
=
Cov(ε, urban)
Cov(β2X, urban)
V ar(β2X)
V ar(ε)
Cov(β2X, urban)
V ar(β2X)
V ar(ε)
V ar(ûrban)
=
Cov(β2X, urban)
V ar(β2X)
V ar(ε)
V ar(ûrban)
(2.2)
where the first equality follows if ε and X are orthogonal and the second equality follows
from the fact that Cov(ε,urban)
V ar(ε)
= Cov(β2X,urban)
V ar(β2X)
, by assumption. Therefore, instead of trying
to find an exogenous variation in the variable urban, I calculate the potential bias coming
from unobservable variables to see if results could be different.
The method, thus, estimates a joint model of housing choice and test score outcome
subject to the restriction that selection on observed and unobserved characteristics is equal.
There are two assumptions that need to be satisfied for the validity of this method. First, the
set of observable characteristics included in the model, that influence students’ test scores, is
only a subset of all characteristics affecting test scores. Second, the distribution of students
in rural and urban areas is not solely determined by any single variable (See Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005b)).
The first assumption should be met only by the fact that there are other covariates left
out of the regression that affect test scores. It should not be hard to argue that the second
assumption is also very likely to hold. It suffices to argue that although on average urban
schools might be better compared to rural ones, there is still heterogeneity among urban and
7The bias is given by plimβ1 = β1 +
Cov(ε,ûrban)
V ar(ûrban)
and it is positive as long as the variable urban is not
orthogonal to the error term ε.
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rural areas.
The effect of unobserved variables would have to be about five times larger than the effect
of observables to fully explain test score differences among students from urban and rural
areas of Brazil. This can be observed by calculating the ratio of the estimated coefficient to
the bias introduced by the unobservables:
ratio =
0.093
0.019
= 4.89 (2.3)
Given that unobservable variables do not fully explain the difference in students test
scores, indeed, students coming from rural areas perform worse compared to their urban
counterparts.
In light of the previous findings, I proceed by analyzing the performance of rural and
urban students by income groups. In Table 2.4 I showed income to be highly correlated
with entrance test scores but little is known about how different income levels affect test
performance across urban and rural areas. To do that, I build on the previous specifications
by including a series of interaction variables to capture income effects over the different areas.
Table 2.6 presents the results.
As can be observed, there is little evidence that income levels affect urban and rural
students in a different way, specially for lower income levels, where the majority of the sample
comes from. Also observe that the coefficients seem to be consistently insignificant across all
specifications. This might be an indicative that the source of the poor performance of rural
students arise because they face other constraints, for example, lower quality of schools.
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2.4.1 Definition of urban dummy
I now change the way I previously defined the variable urban. Previously, I have defined
urban students as those studying in an metropolitan region of the state of Pernambuco. Now,
I redefine the variable urban to vary with the degree of urban population density in each
municipality. Brazil has a relatively high reported level of urbanization, with 84 out of every
100 Brazilians living in cities. The criteria used by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE )8 in determining whether households are urban or rural, however, is based
on political divisions, not on the built environment. Therefore, I define the variable urban
based on four different urban population density cutoffs. Results are reported in Table 2.7.
As can be observed, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 99%
confidence interval. The second row reports the estimated bias using the method proposed
by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b) and the third row reports the relative ratio of the
estimated coefficient to the bias introduced by the unobservables, i.e., how big would the
effects of unobservable variables have to be to fully explain the differences in scores observed
between urban and rural students. Results seem to be robust across definitions of the urban
indicator variable.
2.4.2 School or Rural Area Effects?
The estimations performed above provide evidence that students coming from rural ar-
eas perform significantly worse when compared to urban students. However, one may still
8Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica. The IBGE is the agency responsible for statistical,
geographic, cartographic, geodetic and environmental information in Brazil. The IBGE performs a national
census every ten years, and the questionnaires account for information such as age, household income,
literacy, education, occupation and hygiene levels.
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wonder if such differences do arise from school differences. To put in other words, are rural
students performing worse simply because they come from rural areas or because they study
in less favored rural public schools? While school and rural area effects are not separately
identifiable, it is possible to learn something about their relative importance by testing a
restriction on the urban parameter.
To do that, I add a number of school characteristics to the full specification in Table
2.4. The school measures attempt to capture differences in school infrastructure, quality of
professors and overall school quality. To construct the school variables used in this section,
I use data from the Brazilian school census (CENSO ESCOLAR).9 The data is averaged
among all schools within each municipality in the state of Pernambuco and matched to the
original UFPE dataset. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.8.
One can observe that the average number of public schools run by the federal government
is higher in urban areas.10 Schools in urban areas also offer their students more access to
computer labs. They are also more likely to have access to internet connections and to work
with faster and better computers.
Schools located in rural areas are usually smaller, with fewer classrooms and fewer work-
ers. The ratio of students per teacher is also usually higher in rural schools, hence, for a
given number of students, there are fewer teachers in rural areas compared to urban schools.
These facts translate into classroom sizes that are usually larger in schools located in rural
9The CENSO ESCOLAR is a census conducted by Inep to evaluate the overall quality of Brazilian schools.
The census gathers information on schools, students and professors among all states in Brazil.
10The Brazilian primary and secondary educational system is designed in such way that public schools can
be run by the federal or state governments, or by each municipality. In general, public schools run by the
federal government usually present better quality compared to those owned by the state or municipality.
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areas. Gibbs, Lucas, and Simonite (1996) and Angrist and Lavy (1999) present evidence that
students enrolled in bigger classrooms have worse test performance. Finally, the proportion
of teachers with a college degree is slightly higher for schools located in rural areas.
I proceed by estimating the following model:
scoresi = β0 + β1 · urbani + β ′2 ·Xi + β
′
3 ·Xs + εi, (2.4)
where scoresi, urbani and Xi are defined as in equation 2.1, and Xs is a vector of school
characteristics. If the poor quality of rural public schools is the cause of such score gaps,
one should expect the observed score differences to vanish away. Put in other words, the
coefficient β1 should not show any difference between urban and rural students’ scores. In
that sense, possible remaining test score differences among students will likely capture the
effect of living in a rural area, free of school effects.
Table 2.9 presents the estimated coefficients. Column 1 replicates the estimates in Col-
umn 6 of Table 2.4 and Column 2 includes school characteristics. As can be observed in
Column 2, after the inclusion of the school covariates, differences in test scores between rural
and urban students decrease to 0.01σ, not statistically different from zero.
One might be concerned with the way that the school measures ware constructed. Since
there is a selection of students taking the university entrance exam (those with higher ed-
ucated parents and from the top income distribution) who might have studied in the best
schools from each municipality, averaging the data among all schools within each munici-
pality would overestimate differences in school quality between rural and urban areas for
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students in the sample. To deal with that problem, I reconstruct the school variables drop-
ping schools located in non-urbanized areas. Therefore, I only keep the best schools in each
municipality. Column 3 of Table 2.9 report the new estimation. As expected, the coefficient
increases (to about 0.04σ), but is still not statistically different from zero.
One possible interpretation of the results obtained in Table 2.9 is that part of students
score disparities arise because they study in poor quality public rural schools. A natural
question that arises is that if school characteristics are highly correlated to the municipality
itself, the results obtained so far would indicate that score disparities arise due to worse
municipalities conditions and the poorer quality of schools would be the transmission mech-
anism to the students. To deal with this issue, I exclude the school characteristics used in
the previous estimation and include a new full set of municipality characteristics. I use data
from the Brazilian Municipality Census (MUNIC ) where I try to capture detailed informa-
tion about the infrastructure, dynamics and functionality of each municipality.11 Summary
statistics are presented in Table 2.10.
As one can observe from Table 2.10, municipalities located in urban areas have higher
GDP, are more likely to offer public libraries to the population and also have more museums
and bookstores. Also, they are more likely to have an urban planning committee which can
brings better quality services to the population.
Results for the new estimation are presented in Table 2.11. Column 1 replicates the
11Like the CENSO ESCOLAR, the MUNIC is a census conducted by IBGE to provide detailed information
about structure, dynamics and the functioning of public municipal institutions, especially the town halls,
comprehending, also different sectors and policies which involve the municipal government and the town
halls.
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estimates in Column 6 of Table 2.4 and Column 2 includes municipality characteristics.
As can be observed from Column 2, municipality characteristics do not seem to fully
explain differences in student test scores, thus, providing further evidence that the poorer
quality of the rural schools is the sole source of such high test scores disparities among
students taking university entrance examinations.
2.4.3 Do Students Face Extra Barriers?
Until now I have provided suggestive evidence that poor school quality in rural areas seems
to be the cause of poor test scores among rural students. Nonetheless, this might not be the
only barrier that rural students face to enter the higher education system. Understanding
these extra barriers becomes crucial when designing policies that can alleviate the burden
placed on the less favored rural public school students. In Table 2.12, I discuss some of these
issues.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.12 show that urban students are more likely to take the
entrance exam multiple times. As previously mentioned, due to characteristics of the UFPE
university, there is high desirability in entering it, even if it requires taking the entrance
exam multiple times. Although students that take the entrance exam multiple times might
be the less able, they might have higher chances of entering the university. As observed in
Column 5 of Table 2.4, number of tests taken is positively correlated with test scores.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.12 show that urban students are not more likely to attend
private tutoring classes compared to their rural counterparts. Because students have to pay
to attend private tutoring classes, one should expect rural students to have lower attendance
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rates. Because the students taking the entrance exam are selected in a number of ways
(including income), such differences might not be captured here. Private tutoring classes have
had a significant growth over the past years in Brazil. The combination of very competitive
entrance exams and deficiency of the educational system are important factors affecting
private tutoring classes demand. Although the literature has no consensus about the effects
of private preparation classes on university placement (see Gurun and Millimet (2008), Tansel
and Bircan Bodur (2005) and Kim and Lee (2010)), it can be observed in Columns 5, 6 and 7
of Table 2.12 that private tutoring classes are positively correlated with students test scores.
Studying how private tutoring classes affect students test scores becomes important to
better understand inequalities in access to higher education. If private tutoring classes
have positive effects over students’ scores, students that come from the top of the wealth
distribution might benefit from being able to attend private tutoring classes and might have
higher chances in getting into the higher educational system.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the effectiveness of rural and urban public schools in Brazil. Un-
derstanding what are the barriers faced by rural students in acquiring higher education is
important for determining which policies should be the focus of the government so that all
students have the same opportunity, regardless of family and school characteristics and geo-
graphical location. The findings in this paper suggest that policies that focus on improving
primary and secondary rural public school quality are among the most effective way to make
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the higher educational system more egalitarian and facilitate students’ access into public
universities.
I use a data set of entrance test scores from the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
(UFPE), a major public university in Brazil. The data contains detailed information on
students’ background, school characteristics as well as information about which school the
student was enrolled in when graduating from high school. This allows me to estimate test
score differences among students residing in rural and urban areas. I find that students
coming from urban public schools score on average 0.074 standard deviations above their
rural counterparts. This represents a significant difference in acceptance rates for the rural
students. For example, when looking at the cutoff entrance scores of all majors, increasing
rural students’ grades by 0.074 standard deviation would increase the number of rural stu-
dents accepted to the university by 13.34%. The findings also suggest that the underlying
cause of such scores disparities appears to be the poor quality of schools, specially the public
schools located in rural areas.
The results in this paper contribute to better understanding the educational system in
Brazil and raise a number of interesting questions. Should quotas that support rural students
to enter the university be implemented? Would it help the educational system to be less
unequal and what are the implications of using such a policy instrument? Also, what are
the effects of having a better educated population on labor markets outcomes across urban
and rural areas? Would it create more incentives for migration to urban areas? If so, which
programs, if any, could be created to prevent such flows? Addressing such issues become
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important additions to understanding the Brazilian educational system and improving the
present work and are left as suggestions for future work.
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2.6 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics - Whole Sample: UFPE (2005) Data
Whole Urban Rural
sample Private Public Differences Private Public Differences
µx µx µx µxPrivate-µxPublic µx µx µxPrivate-µxPublic
Normalized test score 0 0.215 −0.323 0.537∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.415 0.439∗∗∗
Age 20.094 19.354 21.691 −2.337∗∗∗ 18.409 20.05 −1.641∗∗∗
Married 0.05 0.035 0.084 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.018 0.039 −0.021∗∗∗
Female 0.571 0.565 0.581 −0.016∗∗∗ 0.561 0.577 −0.016
Hours worked 1.552 1.195 2.232 −1.037∗∗∗ 1.103 1.698 −0.595∗∗∗
Whites 0.466 0.541 0.337 0.203∗∗∗ 0.519 0.398 0.121∗∗∗
Asian 0.047 0.048 0.044 0.004∗ 0.055 0.051 0.004
Black 0.088 0.063 0.14 −0.077∗∗∗ 0.042 0.092 −0.05∗∗∗
Catholic 0.581 0.62 0.477 0.142∗∗∗ 0.737 0.651 0.086∗∗∗
Afro-religion 0.005 0.005 0.005 −0.0001 0.009 0.003 0.006∗∗∗
Protestants 0.218 0.165 0.321 −0.155∗∗∗ 0.141 0.227 −0.086∗∗∗
Atheist 0.111 0.115 0.118 −0.003 0.063 0.069 −0.006
Other religions 0.084 0.093 0.077 0.016∗∗∗ 0.05 0.051 −0.001
Living with parents 0.833 0.851 0.786 0.064∗∗∗ 0.901 0.87 0.031∗∗∗
Mother education
Illiterate 0.031 0.01 0.063 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.017 0.07 −0.053∗∗∗
Incomplete middle school 0.164 0.07 0.32 −0.25∗∗∗ 0.109 0.3 −0.191∗∗∗
Complete middle school 0.085 0.054 0.145 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.046 0.11 −0.064∗∗∗
Incomplete high school 0.068 0.059 0.085 −0.025∗∗∗ 0.05 0.073 −0.023∗∗∗
Complete high school 0.368 0.404 0.305 0.098∗∗∗ 0.41 0.312 0.098∗∗∗
Complete college 0.221 0.313 0.066 0.246∗∗∗ 0.287 0.108 0.179∗∗∗
Grad. School 0.062 0.09 0.016 0.074∗∗∗ 0.082 0.028 0.054∗∗∗
Working mother 0.506 0.576 0.357 0.219∗∗∗ 0.664 0.478 0.186∗∗∗
Income
0 to 300 0.166 0.056 0.35 −0.294∗∗∗ 0.082 0.334 −0.252∗∗∗
301 to 1,000 0.353 0.279 0.465 −0.185∗∗∗ 0.356 0.479 −0.123∗∗∗
1,001 to 1,500 0.149 0.179 0.089 0.089∗∗∗ 0.21 0.107 0.103∗∗∗
1,501 to 2,000 0.109 0.148 0.045 0.103∗∗∗ 0.135 0.051 0.084∗∗∗
2,001 to 3,000 0.092 0.133 0.027 0.106∗∗∗ 0.11 0.016 0.094∗∗∗
3,001 to 5,000 0.068 0.105 0.013 0.092∗∗∗ 0.064 0.004 0.06∗∗∗
More then 5,000 0.058 0.094 0.006 0.088∗∗∗ 0.037 0.003 0.034∗∗∗
Internet user 0.354 0.504 0.137 0.367∗∗∗ 0.313 0.083 0.23∗∗∗
Lab classes 0.36 0.471 0.186 0.285∗∗∗ 0.375 0.213 0.162∗∗∗
Foreign language 0.041 0.06 0.014 0.045∗∗∗ 0.032 0.005 0.027∗∗∗
Reading habit 0.282 0.212 0.389 −0.177∗∗∗ 0.266 0.408 −0.142∗∗∗
Number of tests taken 1.815 1.827 1.852 −0.024∗∗ 1.624 1.631 −0.007
Tutoring classes 0.404 0.473 0.303 0.169∗∗∗ 0.385 0.302 0.083∗∗∗
supletivo 0.028 0.03 0.029 0.0005 0.015 0.013 0.002
vestibular for experience 0.042 0.069 0.003 0.065∗∗∗ 0.036 0.002 0.034∗∗∗
N. of observ. 43,932 24,741 14,633 2,963 1,595
Note: Since not all students in the sample took the ENEM exam, the variable ENEM scores
has lower number of observations. The ENEM exam grades ranges from 0 to 10. Differences
in students from private and public schools are statistically significant at ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05.
∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics - Public School Students: UFPE (2005) Data
Whole sample Urban Rural Differences
µx σx µx σx µx σx µxRural-µxUrban
Normalized test score 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.002 −0.093 0.977 −0.103∗∗∗
Age 21.394 5.345 21.551 5.467 19.977 3.801 −1.574∗∗∗
Married 0.076 0.266 0.081 0.272 0.036 0.187 −0.044∗∗∗
Female 0.586 0.493 0.586 0.493 0.581 0.494 −0.005
Hours worked 2.14 3.218 2.192 3.245 1.668 2.926 −0.524∗∗∗
Whites 0.342 0.474 0.335 0.472 0.4 0.49 0.064∗∗∗
Asian 0.045 0.207 0.044 0.206 0.052 0.221 0.007
Black 0.135 0.341 0.14 0.347 0.09 0.286 −0.049∗∗∗
Afro-religion 0.004 0.067 0.005 0.069 0.002 0.044 −0.002
Protestants 0.313 0.464 0.322 0.467 0.23 0.421 −0.091∗∗∗
Atheist 0.112 0.315 0.116 0.321 0.067 0.251 −0.048∗∗∗
Other religions 0.074 0.261 0.076 0.266 0.048 0.215 −0.028∗∗∗
Living with parents 0.8 0.4 0.791 0.406 0.874 0.332 0.082∗∗∗
Mother education
Illiterate 0.064 0.245 0.063 0.243 0.07 0.255 0.006
Incomplete middle school 0.32 0.466 0.322 0.467 0.302 0.459 −0.020
Complete middle school 0.141 0.348 0.144 0.351 0.109 0.312 −0.034∗∗∗
Incomplete high school 0.084 0.277 0.085 0.28 0.069 0.254 −0.016∗∗
Complete high school 0.306 0.461 0.305 0.461 0.314 0.464 0.009
Complete college 0.069 0.253 0.064 0.245 0.108 0.31 0.043∗∗∗
Grad. School 0.017 0.129 0.016 0.124 0.027 0.163 0.011∗∗∗
Working mother 0.369 0.483 0.357 0.479 0.481 0.5 0.124∗∗∗
Income
0 to 300 0.352 0.477 0.353 0.478 0.337 0.473 −0.016
301 to 1,000 0.467 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.477 0.5 0.011
1,001 to 1,500 0.09 0.287 0.089 0.284 0.106 0.308 0.017∗∗
1,501 to 2,000 0.044 0.205 0.043 0.204 0.051 0.22 0.007
2,001 to 3,000 0.025 0.155 0.026 0.158 0.016 0.125 −0.009∗∗
3,001 to 5,000 0.012 0.108 0.013 0.111 0.004 0.067 −0.008∗∗∗
More then 5,000 0.005 0.069 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.05 −0.002
Internet user 0.129 0.335 0.134 0.341 0.083 0.277 −0.050∗∗∗
Lab classes 0.189 0.391 0.186 0.389 0.214 0.41 0.028∗∗∗
Foreign language 0.013 0.113 0.014 0.116 0.005 0.071 −0.008∗∗∗
Reading habit 0.391 0.488 0.389 0.488 0.411 0.492 0.021∗
Number of tests taken 1.832 0.987 1.854 0.997 1.63 0.869 −0.223∗∗∗
Tutoring classes 0.303 0.46 0.303 0.46 0.302 0.459 −0.001
ENEM scores 5.060 1.656 5.072 1.656 4.959 1.648 −0.113∗
N. of observ. 15,738 14,167 1,571
Note: Since not all students in the sample took the ENEM exam, the variable ENEM scores
has lower number of observations. The ENEM exam grades ranges from 0 to 10. Differences
in students from rural and urban areas are statistically significant at ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05.
∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics - SAEB: SAEB (2005) Data
Whole sample Urban Rural Differences
µx σx µx σx µx σx µxRural-µxUrban
Normalized test score 0.000 1.00 0.002 1.00 −0.038 0.939 −0.040
Age 11.141 1.488 11.13 1.477 11.297 1.64 0.166
Female 0.49 0.5 0.491 0.5 0.475 0.504 −0.016
Working student 0.114 0.318 0.109 0.312 0.197 0.401 0.087∗∗
Mother education
Never Studied 0.072 0.259 0.068 0.252 0.128 0.337 0.059
Incomplete middle school 0.505 0.5 0.506 0.5 0.489 0.505 −0.016
Complete middle school 0.146 0.353 0.142 0.35 0.191 0.398 0.049
Incomplete high school 0.035 0.183 0.036 0.185 0.021 0.146 −0.014
Complete high school 0.155 0.362 0.157 0.364 0.128 0.337 −0.029
Complete college 0.089 0.284 0.092 0.289 0.043 0.204 −0.049
whites 0.245 0.431 0.241 0.428 0.302 0.463 0.060
Pardos1 0.526 0.5 0.537 0.499 0.365 0.485 −0.171∗∗∗
Blacks 0.169 0.375 0.163 0.37 0.254 0.439 0.090∗
Natives 0.038 0.192 0.036 0.187 0.063 0.246 0.027
Asians 0.022 0.146 0.022 0.147 0.016 0.126 −0.006
Living with parents 0.921 0.269 0.92 0.271 0.937 0.246 0.016
Reading habit 0.419 0.494 0.412 0.492 0.531 0.503 0.119∗
Internet user 0.053 0.224 0.055 0.229 0.016 0.128 −0.039
N. of observ. 1,033 968 65
Note: 1 Due to interbreeding of races (blacks and whites, natives and whites and blacks and
natives) individuals classify themselves as brown or pardos. Differences in students from rural
and urban areas are statistically significant at ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source:
SAEB schools evaluation 2005.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of UFPE Entrance Test Score - OLS estimation: UFPE (2005) Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban 0.103∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.043)
Age −0.003∗ 0.001 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Married 0.046 0.038 0.013 0.135∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.058 0.249∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.048) (0.069) (0.099)
Gender (female=1) −0.283∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.276∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029)
Hours worked −0.014∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Asian −0.052 −0.054 −0.039 −0.047 −0.040 0.012 −0.034
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.056)
Black −0.097∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.037∗ −0.013 −0.006 0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038)
Afro-religion −0.008 0.018 0.005 −0.041 −0.191 −0.182 −0.383∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.123) (0.105) (0.128) (0.122) (0.192)
Protestants −0.026 0.008 0.035∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Atheist 0.304∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.023 0.083∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) (0.045)
Other religions 0.295∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.026 0.191∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.061)
Mother education
Complete middle school 0.092∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.011 0.003 −0.014 −0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033)
Complete high school 0.216∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.052∗∗ −0.005 0.069∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032)
Complete college 0.666∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.052 0.196∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.047) (0.042) (0.071)
Working mother 0.026 0.004 −0.022 −0.002 0.027 0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029)
Income
301 to 1,000 0.300∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.031 0.216∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
1,001 to 1,500 0.563∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.049) (0.045) (0.081)
1,501 to 2,000 0.722∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.112 0.525∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.040) (0.070) (0.070) (0.116)
2,001 to 3,000 0.981∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.105) (0.084) (0.160)
3,001 to 5,000 1.292∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.081) (0.164) (0.122) (0.213)
More then 5,000 1.480∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.137) (0.228) (0.201) (0.269)
Internet user 0.197∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.035 0.297∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.045) (0.041) (0.073)
Lab classes 0.170∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.011 0.129∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042)
Foreign language 0.437∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.365∗∗
(0.068) (0.106) (0.095) (0.157)
Reading habit(yes=1) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Number of tests 0.367∗∗∗
(0.008)
Tutoring classes 0.197∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.027) (0.043)
ENEM Score 0.460∗∗∗
(0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.040 0.073 0.134 0.273 0.158 0.635 0.203
Estimated bias 0.019
N. of observ. 15,738 15,738 15,738 15,738 15,738 7,775 4,037 4,037
Note: All specifications include a constant, not reported. Specifications 6 and 7 restrict the
sample to students taking the entrance exam for the first time. Specification 8 is the same as
in 7 but it does not control for the ENEM exam scores. Robust Standard Errors presented in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of ENEM Test Score - OLS estimation: UFPE (2005) Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 0.113∗ 0.092 0.131∗∗ 0.086 0.033 0.031
(0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.055) (0.068)
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ income Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.061 0.117 0.195 0.329 0.203
N. of observ. 7, 266 7, 266 7, 266 7, 266 7, 351 4, 093
Note: All specifications include a constant, not reported. Specifications 6 restrict the sample
to students taking the entrance exam for the first time. Robust Standard Errors presented in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of UFPE Entrance Test Score by Income Groups: UFPE (2005)
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban 0.059 0.058 0.055 0.033
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.036)
Urban x Inc301−1,000 0.023 0.032 0.051 0.014
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.049)
Urban x Inc1,001−1,500 0.045 0.084 0.120 0.030
(0.095) (0.094) (0.093) (0.084)
Urban x Inc1,501−2,000 0.149 0.189 0.197 0.139
(0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.116)
Urban x Inc2,001−3,000 0.940∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.173) (0.176) (0.159)
Urban x Inc3,001−5,000 0.245 0.244 0.234 −0.061
(0.353) (0.324) (0.344) (0.387)
Urban x Inc5,000+ −0.617 −0.660 −0.614 −0.351
(0.421) (0.460) (0.472) (0.383)
Income
301 to 1,000 0.293∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047)
1,001 to 1,500 0.576∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.079)
1,501 to 2,000 0.667∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.109)
2,001 to 3,000 0.215 0.203 0.117 −0.155
(0.164) (0.162) (0.166) (0.149)
3,001 to 5,000 1.217∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗
(0.340) (0.311) (0.332) (0.379)
More then 5,000 2.331∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.429) (0.445) (0.357)
Student controls No Yes Yes Yes
Parents’ education No No Yes Yes
Other controls No No No Yes
Adjusted R2
N. of observ. 15, 738 15, 738 15, 738 15, 738
Note: All specifications include a constant, not reported. Other controls include all control
variables reported in Column 5 of Table 2.4. Robust Standard Errors presented in parenthesis.
∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.7: Definition of Urban Dummy by Urban Population Density: UFPE (2005) Data
Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density
> 0.80 > 0.85 > 0.90 > 0.95
Urban 0.110∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.037) (0.030) (0.022)
Estimated bias 0.018 0.028 0.020 0.030
Ratio 6.11 5.28 5.15 2.4
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of observ. 4, 037 4, 037 4, 037 4, 037
Note: All the models include the same control variables as in Column 7 of Table 2.4. Robust
Standard Errors presented in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE
Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.8: Summary statistics - School Characteristics: CENSO ESCOLAR (2005) Data
Whole sample Urban Rural Differences
µx σx µx σx µx σx µxRural-µxUrban
Federal School 0.036 0.041 0.038 0.04 0.019 0.044 −0.019∗∗∗
Computer Lab 0.445 0.1 0.454 0.061 0.372 0.23 −0.082∗∗∗
Sports complex 0.067 0.068 0.064 0.043 0.091 0.16 0.027∗∗∗
No internet access 0.199 0.151 0.184 0.116 0.308 0.289 0.123∗∗∗
Meals in school 0.973 0.044 0.974 0.033 0.97 0.093 −0.003∗
Number of Classrooms 13.735 1.49 13.854 1.102 12.815 3.007 −1.039∗∗∗
School Employees 60.381 7.697 61.069 5.907 55.074 14.689 −5.994∗∗∗
Professors with college degree 0.598 0.063 0.596 0.045 0.609 0.138 0.012∗∗∗
Students/professors Ratio 28.718 3.438 28.679 2.736 29.023 6.725 0.344∗∗
Pentium computer 6.51 4.418 6.968 4.327 2.973 3.401 −3.995∗∗∗
School shares building 0.013 0.048 0.008 0.022 0.056 0.118 0.047∗∗∗
Cafeteria 0.243 0.129 0.263 0.108 0.09 0.166 −0.172∗∗∗
Bathrooms in school 0.997 0.03 1 0 0.975 0.084 −0.025∗∗∗
N. of observ. 4,036 3,573 463
Note: Differences in rural and urban school characteristics are statistically significant at
∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: CENSO ESCOLAR 2005.
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Table 2.9: Determinants of Entrance Test Score - School Characteristics: UFPE (2005) Data
(1) (2) (3)
Urban 0.093∗∗∗ 0.016 0.041
(0.028) (0.033) (0.038)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
School characteristics No Yes Yes
N. of observ. 4, 037 4, 036 4, 036
Note: Column 1 replicates the estimates in Column 7 of Table 2.4. Robust Standard Errors
presented in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Table 2.11: Determinants of Entrance Test Score - Municipalities Characteristics: UFPE
(2005) Data
(1) (2)
Urban 0.093∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.028) (0.041)
Other controls Yes Yes
Municipalities characteristics No Yes
N. of observ. 4, 037 4, 037
Note: Column 1 replicates the estimates in Column 7 of Table 2.4. Robust Standard Errors
presented in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE Vestibular 2005.
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Chapter 3
Climbing the Educational Ladder:
The Relative Performance of Rural
and Urban Students in Brazilian
Universities
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing concern as to how higher education could
reach rural students. The federal government recently has launched a program whose main
purpose was to build several university campuses in rural areas. This would allow more
students to enter higher education and benefit from its high returns (see Psacharopoulos
(1994) and Fernandes and Menezes Filho (2000)), especially those students that otherwise
would not have the opportunity to study. Despite the effort to increase the number of higher
educational institutions, rural students usually face disadvantages when trying to obtain
a college degree (see Sampaio (2011)). A natural question is how could acceptance rates
for rural students be increased, for example through affirmative action, and what are the
consequences of doing so. In this paper we discuss differences of rural and urban students in
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Brazilian universities and analyze their performance while in college in order to determine
better ways for increasing rural schooling and to decrease income inequalities in Brazil.
The Brazilian primary, secondary and higher education system is composed of private
and public schools. There is no fee for studying in a public school or university, however,
high fees exist for those attending private schools and private universities. At the primary
and secondary level, private schools are generally superior when compared to public schools,
but Brazilian public universities are generally better than private universities. Therefore,
students coming from wealthier families are more likely to study in private primary and
secondary schools. As a consequence and given the main requirement to be accepted for
higher education is a very competitive entrance exam, high income families are more likely
place their children in good public universities (Cavalcanti, Guimaraes, and Sampaio (2010)).
A recent study from the An´ısio Teixeira National Institute for Educational Research and
Studies (Inep)1 shows that rural school students generally perform worse than their urban
counterparts. Hence, combining these findings with the fact that rural areas in Brazil often
have worse schooling systems, it is crucial to understand and to quantify differences in
performance of those coming from less favored regions when they are granted access to a
higher education institution.
The purpose of this paper is to look at differences in GPA performance between students
coming from rural and urban areas in Brazil who were granted access to the higher educa-
tional system.2 In addition to the barriers faced by students attending the public primary
1Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais An´ısio Teixeira. The Inep is an agency directly
linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Education whose goal is to promote research and evaluation of the
Brazilian educational system.
2An urban area is characterized by higher population density and vast human features in comparison
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and secondary school system (see Cavalcanti, Guimaraes, and Sampaio (2010)), Sampaio
(2011) show that students coming from rural areas in Brazil face higher barriers to acquiring
access to higher education compared to their urban counterparts. In light of these findings,
it is crucial to understand how these students perform once they are granted access to the
university. Such knowledge will help to design better and more efficient ways of selecting
students to enter the university system and help in the design of public policies to decrease
regional educational inequalities and overall income inequality in Brazil.
In order to analyze the performance of urban and rural students, we use a data set
comprised of students who entered a major public university in Brazil. The data contains
detailed information on students’ background (which includes parent’s education, family
income, if the students had access to the internet while in high school, among many others),
high school characteristics (for example, whether the student had science labs and English
classes) as well as information about which high school the student was enrolled in. It also
contains detailed information on each students’ major and their GPA performance while in
the university. Hence, we use regression methods to identify the effects of rural and urban
schooling on performance in the university. A quantile regression approach (see Koenker and
Bassett (1978)) is used to observe GPA variations along the quantile distribution for urban
and rural students. Using such methods allows us to better understand who performs better
(urban or rural students) and at which conditional GPA quantiles are differences mostly
pronounced.
to areas surrounding it. Urban areas may be cities, towns or conurbations, but the term is not commonly
extended to rural settlements such as villages and hamlets.
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We find that students coming from rural public schools have higher observed GPA perfor-
mance than their urban counterparts, on average 0.34 standard deviations above. Further-
more, we find suggestive evidence that such differences disappear for those that have higher
conditional GPA, i.e., the top urban students in their class perform as well as their top
rural colleagues. This evidence indicates that rural students with lower conditional GPA’s
would benefit the most from entering the higher educational system. They would benefit
from future higher wage rates, which would help decrease regional and income inequalities
in the country and would help increase overall university performance (see Duflo, Dupas,
and Kremer (2008)). We also find that policies that help increase the number of public rural
students in the university system, such as quotas, grade increases, etc, would also help to de-
crease regional educational inequalities and help fight the high income inequalities observed
in Brazil. Lastly, we show that rural students do not distribute evenly across the highest
and the lowest competitive majors at the university, which could be an important source of
income inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a theoretical model
comprising the Brazilian educational system. Section 3.3 presents the data and summary
statistics for rural and urban students in Brazil. The estimation strategy used in the paper
is described in section 3.4 and results are presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple two-period economy consisting of a continuum of students,
a college and a household, represented by the parents, which make educational investment
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decisions for their children. In the first period, the parents decide how much to invest in
their children’s education. In the second period, students take a college entrance exam that
determine who gets accepted to enter the public higher educational system.
In this model, investment decisions are undertaken by the parents in the form of division
of time allocated between educational and working activities for their child. Education
output produced represents achievement in exam performance and high wages in the future.
Parental input in educational activities represents not only children’s enrollment in school,
but also the parents’ own effort in assisting the child with studies.
In the first period, the parents maximize their utility by choosing the children’s optimal
time allocation between studying and working. Note that the parents place a positive value
on educational activities because they might increase the children’s probability of having a
higher income in the future.
In the second period, the students take an entrance exam where they compete for college
admission. In Brazil, the only method that public colleges can use to select their applicants is
giving them an entrance exam and ranking all applicants based on their grade performance.
The best students are guaranteed a place at the university.
Another important factor that should be described by the model is the significant dif-
ference in school quality between rural and urban areas of Brazil. Combined with parent’s
educational allocation choices and children’s own ability endowments, they determine one’s
performance on the university’s entrance exam.
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3.2.1 Students
There is a continuum of students in each area (urban and rural). Student i′s pre-college
ability level is denoted by qi. Students are heterogeneous with regards to their pre-college
ability levels and we assume that students can have high type ability and low type ability,
i.e., qi ∈ {qh, ql} where qh > ql.
There are α students located in rural areas where αh is the proportion of students that
have high pre-college ability and αl the proportion that have low pre-college ability. In urban
areas we assume that there are β students and that βh have hight pre-college ability and βl
have low pre-college ability levels. That is,
αh + αl = α (3.1)
βh + βl = β (3.2)
Student’s college entrance test scores (ETS) are assumed to be a function of the quality
of the schools in which they have studied during childhood (Kindergarten to High School),
pre-college ability levels and time invested by parents in their child’s education. Thus, ETS
is given by
ETS = f(δj, qi, T ) (3.3)
where δj is a parameter reflecting different school quality between rural and urban areas,
i.e., δj ∈ {δu, δr} where δu > δr, qi captures the students’ pre-college own ability terms and
T indicates parent’s investments in their children’s education, i.e., T ∈ {0, 1}. It is useful to
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think of T as representing the total time that the child spends in activities that increase his
educational level other than the mandatory schooling attendance. For example, the amount
of time spent doing homework, reading time and the amount of time spent with their parents
doing education related activities.
Assumption 1 f(·) is strictly increasing in δj and in qi and f(δj, qi, 0) = 0.
Assumption 1 guarantees that students who study in better schools or that have higher
pre-college ability are likely to have a better ETS. Also, if there is no investment in children’s
education, T = 0, they will have very low performance on the university entrance exam.
3.2.2 College
Secondary education is mandatory for those wishing to pursue higher education. In
addition, students must pass a competitive entrance examination (known as vestibular) for
their specific course of study. The number of candidates per available place in the freshman
class may be in excess of 30 or 40 to one in the most competitive courses at the top public
universities. In some particular courses with small number of vacancies, this number can be
as high as 200. As the numbers depict, the entrance exams for public universities are highly
competitive in Brazil.
It is clear that not everyone wanting to pursue higher education will be able to do it.
The universities can only offer a limited amount of places in the freshman class each year.
Thus, each year the university offers to accept K students to their freshman class.
Assumption 2 β > K and αh + βh < K.
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Assumption 2 states that there are more students in urban areas than the total number
of students that the university can accept at any given year. We also assume that the K
places offered by the university exceeds the total number of high ability students.
3.2.3 Household
Assume that parents make decisions for their children and that their objective function is
to maximize a utility function that depends on household consumption levels. The household
consumption levels directly depend on child’s income levels. In essence, parents choose
the optimal time allocated to their child’s education such that household consumption is
maximized.
The parent chooses C1 and C2 in periods t = {1, 2}. A utility function that takes
household consumption (C) in periods 1 and 2 in its arguments is given by the following3:
U(C1, C2) = C1 + γC2 (3.4)
where γ is a discount factor for future consumption. Parents value their children’s education
because it yields higher income levels and, consequently, higher future consumption. Parent’s
choice of time allocated to child’s education directly relates to the probability that the child
will pass the university entrance exam, which in turn, increases the child’s educational levels.
The probability of success in the university entrance exam is directly relates to student’s ETS
and is given by
p(δj, qi, T ) = p(f(δj, qi, T )) (3.5)
3See Glewwe (2002) for a model of schooling choices using a similar utility function to denote household
preferences.
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Households’ consumption in each time period is given by:
C1 = Y + (1− T )Yl (3.6)
C2 = Y + (1− p(·))Yl + p(·)Yh (3.7)
where Y is parental income in each period, Yl is child’s’ income when they have low educa-
tion levels (those with no university degree) and Yh is child’s income when they have high
education levels (beyond university degree).
Assumption 3 Yh is sufficiently high compared to Yl.
That is, the child’s income when he has completed a university degree must be higher than
his income when he does not attend the university. If that is not the case, parents’ decisions
are trivial and they will never invest time to send their child to acquire higher education.
3.2.4 College Acceptance
Given the model’s description presented so far, we can more closely observe acceptance
into the university.
Proposition 1 A student from an rural area enters the university only if
f(δr, qh, T ) ≥ f(δu, ql, T ) (3.8)
Proof Suppose not, i.e., f(δr, qh, T ) < f(δu, ql, T ). Since
f(δu, qh, T ) > f(δu, ql, T ) > f(δr, qh, T ) > f(δr, ql, T ) (3.9)
and by assumption βh + βl > K, no student from a rural area could enter the university,
which is a contradiction.
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From proposition 1, we can fully characterize the probability scheme of entering the
university for each type of student.
Lemma 1 Given f(δr, qh, T ) ≥ f(δu, ql, T ), student i′s probability of entering the university
is the following:
p(f(δj, qi, T )) =

0 if T = 0
0 if δj = δr, qi = ql, T = 1
1 if δj = δu, qi = qh, T = 1
1 if δj = δr, qi = qh, T = 1
K−(αh+βh)
K
if δj = δu, qi = ql, T = 1
(3.10)
Thus, student’s that receive no educational investments, i.e. T = 0, will not succeed in
entering a college degree. Also, students that study in an rural area and have low pre-college
ability will be denied a college education. Students that have high pre-college ability levels,
regardless of living in an rural or urban area, and that receive educational investments will
be guaranteed admission at the university. The remaining low ability urban students will
compete for the remaining spots. Given the probabilities of entering college for each type of
student, we can now characterize parent’s optimal educational investment choices.
3.2.5 Household Representative Optimal Time Investment
The household representative will maximize the household’s utility function with respect
to the optimal allocation of time invested in the child’s education. We assume that the
representatives are risk neutral and make their decisions based on the students’ expected
value of passing the entrance exam p(f(δj, qi, T )). The maximization problem becomes:
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max
T∈{0,1}
Y + (1− T )Yl + γ [Y + (1− p(·))Yl + p(·)Yh] (3.11)
It is, thus, straightforward to derive the optimal time invested in child’s education by the
household representative.
Proposition 2 The optimal educational time allocation (T ) invested in students that have
high pre-college ability, regardless of the area that they reside, is T ∗ = 1, given Yh is suffi-
ciently large.
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 asserts that the optimal choice made by the household representative is
to fully invest in the high pre-college ability child, i.e., they will receive full attention in
regards to their educational formation and will not be required to work. These students will
have high performance in the entrance exam and will be guaranteed admission to the higher
educational system.
Another important consequence of proposition 2 is that the wage difference between
Yh and Yl such that household representatives will invest time in education of their child is
dependent on the discount factor γ. The higher parents weight future consumption, the fewer
requirements they will make about children’s future income in order to invest. Conversely,
households with very low discount factors will not invest in their child’s education unless
future wages (Yh) are very high. See appendix B for complete details.
Proposition 3 The optimal educational time allocation (T ) invested in students that have
low pre-college ability and that come from rural areas is T ∗ = 0.
Proof See Appendix B.
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Students that come from rural areas of Brazil and that have low pre-college ability levels
do not receive educational investments and are sent to work to increase the household’s
consumption levels. These students will be denied access to the university. Therefore, we
should not expect to find rural, low pre-college ability, students in the university.
Proposition 4 The optimal educational time allocation (T ) invested in students that have
low pre-college ability and that come from urban areas is increasing in γ and K.
Proof See Appendix B.
Urban household’s with high discount factors are more likely to worry about their chil-
dren’s future and will invest in their education, increasing their chance of passing the entrance
exam to the university. Similarly, investments will be more likely when the urban household
observes higher chances on students’ success rates given an offering of larger number of places
into the freshman class any given year.
The model constructed above attempts to depict how the Brazilian educational system
foundations is organized, comparing households and prospective students that come from
rural and urban areas of the country and discussing the different barriers that they face
when applying for a college degree. As the model suggests, rural students accepted for
higher education appear to be drawn disproportionately from the left-hand side of the ability
distribution.
3.2.6 Empirical Implications
The model generates the following implications, which we examine in the next sections.
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1. Students coming from rural areas are likely to have lower performance in the university
entrance exam compared to those coming from urban areas. Following previous research, we
test this implication by analyzing differences between urban and rural areas and students’
university entrance exam grades.4
2. Once at the university, students coming from rural areas are likely to outperform their
urban classmates. In particular, students coming from rural areas face poorer school quality
and, consequently, less educational time investments. In such case, they would face a much
lower probability of passing the university entrance exam than urban students. Consequently,
rural students that gain access to higher education must be a highly selected sample, with
high pre-college ability, indeed so high, that it enables them to pass the exam. Therefore, one
should expect these students to perform really well while in college. We test this prediction
by comparing grades of urban and rural students while in the university.
3. The high pre-college ability urban students and part of the high pre-college ability rural
students will enter the highest competitive majors at UFPE. As described by the model, the
high pre-college ability urban students will have the highest ETS because of their school
quality differentials and are likely to enter the highest competitive majors. They will be
followed by the high pre-college ability rural students, who have lower ETS due to their
poorer school quality. Therefore, one should expect to find little (or no) GPA differences
between students enrolled in the highest competitive majors at UFPE.
4. The remaining high pre-college ability rural students and the urban students with low
4Empirical research has found that students coming form rural areas in Brazil face higher barriers to
acquiring access to higher education compared to their urban counterparts (see Sampaio (2011)).
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pre-college ability will enter the lowest competitive majors. The low pre-college ability urban
students have the lowest ETS among university’s entrants, therefore, they will only be able
to compete with the other rural high pre-college ability students for the lowest competitive
majors. GPA differences among those enrolled in the low competitive majors are likely to
vary significantly among urban and rural students due to differences in pre-college ability
levels.
3.3 Data
The dataset used in this paper comes from students’ who enter the Universidade Federal
de Pernambuco (UFPE), which is a major university that is located in the Northeast of
Brazil. UFPE is a public university, which charges no tuition fees. The main requirement
for entering the universities’ undergraduate programs is an entrance exam that must be taken
by all candidates. The exam consists of two rounds, and students are required to choose
their major before the first round. Candidates must take the following subjects in the first
round: Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Foreign Language, Chemistry, Geography, Literature,
History and Portuguese. The second round is taken only by those students who scored a
minimum required to pass in the first round. Final acceptance for higher education depends
not only on the final score obtained by the student, but also on which major the student
applied for. That is, obtaining a score of 80% might guarantee acceptance in the Engineering
College but not in the College of Law, for example. For those who pass the entrance exam,
there are predetermined classes that must be taken through the course of the university, with
limited choice of elective classes. Further, each major has its own curriculum that must be
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meet in order for a student to graduate.
A socioeconomic questionnaire in the registration process provides rich and detailed in-
formation on students’ family background, individual characteristics, and previous education
information, such as the type and the location of school attended in the primary and sec-
ondary education system. The data include all candidates who took the entrance exam in the
year of 2005, about 55,000, and follows those who pass the entrance exam into the university.
To better identify the effect of interest, we impose some restrictions in the sample. First, we
consider only students living in the state of Pernambuco, given students coming from other
states are likely to be a very selective group and there is no information about which high
school they graduated from. These students are likely to come from the top of the income
distribution because they face higher costs of going to another state to take the exam, may be
highly motivated to enter the university and are likely to be applying to highly competitive
majors. Secondly, we remove all students enrolled in a private school, given the focus of the
paper is on measuring differences between urban and rural public school students and their
performance in the university. Finally, we do not include students who graduated from high
school via the supletivo method as well as all students taking the exam as a mock exam. The
supletivo method is offered by the Ministry of Education as an alternative education method
for those individuals who had either dropped out or did not have the chance to start school
at the recommended age or had large grade-for-age distortions. It is very similar to the
General Educational Development (GED) certification studied by Heckman and LaFontaine
(2007).
Summary statistics for the university applicants and entrants are presented in Table 3.1.
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Comparing the outcomes of interest between applicants and entrants and students coming
from rural and urban areas, we can first observe that urban students have substantially
higher scores in the entrance exam, with a score difference of about 0.12 standard deviation
(σ), on average. This represents a significant advantage for students taking the exam. For
example, looking at the average score of all students applying to the university, an increase of
0.12 standard deviation represents a gain of 2,414 positions. Once we observe students in the
university, such score differences reverse in favor of rural students, i.e., the GPA difference is
about 0.07 standard deviation (σ), on average. It is important to observe that these numbers
do not reflect the true difference between rural and urban students. There are a number
of observable and unobservable characteristics that must be accounted for before one can
correctly make inferences about the rural-urban effect.
One can also observe that the rural population applying for the entrance exam is younger
when compared to the urban applicants. The age difference, present among test takers,
persists for students entering the university, i.e., those coming from rural areas are on average
5.5% younger then urban students. The gender gap seems to slightly vary among applicants
and entrants. Among all applicants, 58% are female but this ratio decreases to about 49%
among university entrants. Also, there are fewer female university students who come from
rural areas than from urban areas. This finding might be due to cultural differences such
as, for example, values surrounding the role of daughters in performing housework which
prevents them to invest in education (See Evertsson (2006) and Duryea, Lam, and Levison
(2007)).
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Students entering the university have better educated mothers, on average, when com-
pared to applicants. As can be observed in Table 3.1, the entrants are more likely to have
mothers with high school and college degrees. Furthermore, rural entrants also come from
better educated families. This last statement deserves more attention. Rural students taking
the exam and entering the university are usually top students who come from wealthier and
more educated families within rural areas. This selective characteristic may help explain
such results.
In regards to income levels, one can observe that students who enter the university come
from wealthier families. Figure 3.1 depicts the income distribution between test applicants
and university entrants. Such evidence retracts how unequal the Brazilian educational system
appears to be, where students from more favored families have higher chances of acquiring
free, high quality higher education.
Nonetheless, despite the already mentioned selective characteristic of our data, university
students from rural areas have much lower income levels compared to their urban classmates.
Therefore, despite coming from the upper income distribution within rural areas, rural stu-
dents have lower income levels. Figure 3.2 shows the income distribution between rural and
urban university students.
Lastly, students entering the higher educational system are more likely to have access to
internet, on average 57% more. They also attended primary and secondary schools where
they had an average of 37% more laboratory classes and are more likely to have studied
intensively a foreign language. As for tutoring preparation for the entrance exam, university
entrants had on average 41% more private preparation classes.
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Among entrants, we can observe that rural students have less access to internet, less
foreign language instruction and attended fewer laboratory classes during their primary and
secondary school years. They also have less access to tutoring lessons in order to prepare for
the university entrance exam.5
3.4 Methodology
The raw GPA difference among urban and rural students, reported in Table 3.1, does
not address the possibility that the relation between students GPA may be driven by other
variables such as income levels, family background and individual characteristics.
Our empirical specification captures the GPA difference between urban and rural students
while controlling for the characteristics mentioned above. We estimate the following model:
GPAij = ψ0 + ψ1urbanij + ψ2scoresi + ψ
′
3Xij1 + ψ
′
4Xij2 +majorj + εi (3.12)
where GPAij is the standardized GPA for student i, urbanij is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the student comes from an urban area and 0 otherwise, scoresi is a student’s i
entrance score, Xij1 is a vector of family background characteristics for student i, Xij2 a
vector of individual characteristics for student i and majorj is major fixed effects to control
for differences in GPA levels within each major attended by students. Our model predicts
that the coefficient ψ1 should be negative.
As is well known, consistent estimates of ψ1 via equation (3.12) require that the error
5See Gurun and Millimet (2008) and Banerjee et al. (2007) for detailed discussion of the effects of tutoring
lessons on university placement and test scores.
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term be uncorrelated with urbani. In such a case, the researcher can correctly identify
causal relationships between area of residency and university grade point averages. The
focus of this paper, though, is not to identify causal relationships between area of residency
and university GPA. Our primary focus is to identify the source of such GPA differences
among urban and rural entrant students and to make sure that these differences do not
arise because of different family background or some individual characteristics. Therefore,
we want to observe whether such score differences remain even after controlling for family
and individual characteristics. If this is the case, then the observed GPA differences do not
arise because of different levels of income among rural and urban students or different levels
of parental education, for example.
One might be concerned that there might still be some unobservable family background
characteristics that are not controlled for and that might drive such GPA differences. The
question indicates the importance of controlling for students’ entrance scores at the univer-
sity, the scoresi variable included in equation (3.12). Because entrance scores are directly
affected by family background and individual characteristics, this variable will capture most
of the heterogeneity between rural and urban students. This is observed when bringing
equation (3.12) to the data. The estimated coefficient of interest increases in magnitude.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 presents estimates of the GPA difference between urban and rural university
students. We consider various specifications where different sets of covariates (family back-
ground characteristics and individual characteristics) are introduced. Robust standard errors
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are presented in parenthesis and adjusted R-squared estimates are presented at the end of
the table. Before analyzing each specification, it is important to notice that urban students
have consistently worse performance in the university compared to their rural classmates
(ψ1 is negative and statistically significant across all specifications). Also, all specifications
reported in Table 3.2 include fixed effects for each university major. Failing to include such
fixed effects would treat students in different majors as homogeneous, which would lead to
wrong parameter estimates. That is, students applying for different majors not only face dif-
ferent acceptance rates (competitive majors usually accept high performing students when
compared to low competitive ones), but are also subject to grading procedures that vary
substantially once taking major-specific classes.
In column (1) we present the simplest specification, where no covariates are included.
As observed, students from urban areas have a score disadvantage of about 0.195 standard
deviations (σ) when compared to their rural classmates. However, as already mentioned,
this difference does not represent the true rural/urban GPA difference, given no controls for
students and family background are included in the specification.
Columns (2) and (3) builds on the basic model by including, respectively, student’s indi-
vidual characteristics and parents’ educational levels. As expected, the coefficients decreases
in magnitude, showing the importance of the included covariates in capturing heterogeneity
between rural and urban students. In the fourth column we include parental income levels in
the equation. This is an important variable to control for, because income levels have great
variability across Brazilian rural and urban areas. Due to the high selection of the rural
students that are in the university (rural students composing the top income distribution
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among rural population), one should expect rural and urban students’ GPA differences to de-
crease after controlling for parental income levels. We observe, however, that the coefficient
remains almost unchanged.
The specification in column (6) includes (a) controls for the number of entrance exams
taken before students gained access to the university and (b) whether the student attended
private tutoring classes in order to prepare for the exam. One can observe that the GPA
difference increases to about -0.18σ and is still significant at the 95% confidence interval.
Because students from urban areas are more likely to take the entrance exam multiple times
and also to attend private tutoring classes, one should expect the GPA difference to increase,
which is exactly what is observed. From the specification in column (6) we can also observe
that the number of tests taken before entering the university is negatively correlated with
students’ GPA. Although students that take the entrance exam multiple times before been
granted access to the university are more likely to have higher entrance scores (see Sampaio
(2011)), they probably belong to the bottom part of the student ability distribution, i.e.,
their score advantage, compared to the first-time-takers entrants, does not reflect ability but
is a result of a learning-by-doing procedure or luck. Therefore, their poor performance in the
entrance exams will be reflected in lower performance levels while in the higher educational
system.
Lastly, in column (7) we include student entrance exam scores as a control variable to
our model. We hope to capture most of the heterogeneity between rural and urban students
when controlling for students’ entrance scores at the university. The GPA difference between
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rural and urban students now becomes larger (increases to about -0.19σ) compared to column
(6).
The sample used so far contains all students taking that exam under the restrictions
described in section 3.3. However, given there are about 5,000 spots available each year at
UFPE and more than 50,000 candidates, many students are not admitted and, if they desire
to acquire higher education for free, they must take the exam again in the following year.
For example, about 25% of all students applying for the university in 2005 had already taken
an entrance exam in the past years. First and multiple time exam takers might be different
in a number of characteristics. For example, they might have different ability levels or be
differently motivated to enter the university. Also, those taking the exam multiple times
might not be exogenously distributed across urban and rural areas. Thus, the heterogeneity
between first and multiple time exam takers might confound the results.
In Table 3.2 part II we address the problems of heterogeneity between test takers. Hence,
in columns (8) and (9) we repeat the estimation performed in columns (6) and (7) but re-
stricting the sample to all students who are taking the exam for their first time. This
restriction induces a more homogeneous sample and a cleaner result. Note that the coeffi-
cients on specifications (8) and (9) follow the same trends as in specifications (6) and (7)
but are larger in magnitude and significance levels. The difference between rural and urban
students GPA increases to about -0.34σ. Thus, results seem to be robust across specification
indicating that students coming from rural areas outperform their urban classmates. We
may conclude that students coming from rural areas of Brazil would benefit the most from
being granted access to the university system as they would benefit from future higher wage
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rates, which would help decrease regional and income inequalities in the country and would
help increase overall university performance. As shown by Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2008),
students benefit from high-achieving peers as teachers are allowed to present material at a
more appropriate level.
3.5.1 Quantile Results
In this subsection we analyze quantile regression estimates. Quantile regression methods
were first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and offer a mechanism for estimating
models for the conditional median function, and the full range of other conditional quantile
functions. Thus, it provides a more complete statistical analysis on how the variable of
interest varies among the different quantiles. Here we provide quantile estimates for the
variable of interest, i.e., the indicator variable urban. We estimate the quantile regression
using the full set of controls reported in column (7) of Table 3.2. Results are presented in
Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 plots the quantile regression estimates for the urban dummy. The solid line
represents the point estimates, with the shaded grey area depicting a 90 percent pointwise
confidence interval. Superimposed on the plot is a dashed line representing the ordinary least
squares estimate of the mean effect, with two dotted lines representing again a 90 percent
confidence interval for this coefficient.
The estimates performed using quantile regression methods will provide a better under-
standing of how different are the marginal effects of students’ GPA to the different residency
locations (urban or rural). Students coming from rural areas obviously perform better in the
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university than their urban classmates, about 0.93 standard deviations higher according to
the OLS estimates of the mean effect, but as is clear from the quantile regression results the
disparity is much smaller in the higher quantiles of the distribution. Therefore, despite rural
students having a higher GPA on average, those that have higher conditional GPA’s are less
affected by coming from an urban area. This reassures that if more rural students (specially
the lower conditional GPA’s) ware to be granted access to the university, they would have
higher future income levels which might help decrease regional and income differentials and
they would help increase university performance overall, where the latter would have better
(more motivated) students in its classrooms. Also, efforts to increase educational level and
wage of rural students would help diminish the prevalence and intensity of future child labor
and improve the likelihood that their children stay in school (see Ersado (2005)).
3.5.2 Income Inequalities
In the previous subsections we have shown evidence that students that come from rural
areas have higher performance in the university when compared to their urban counterparts,
specially those with lower conditional GPA. As shown by Sampaio (2011), rural students
face bigger barriers in entering the higher educational system in Brazil. In such a case, there
is room for policy implementation (for example, affirmative actions such as quotas, grade
increases, etc) such that the number or rural students that get into the university can be
increased with combined gains in efficiency for the university as a whole since there will be
an increase in performance levels among students in the university. Such policies could also
help to decrease regional inequalities, since it guarantees rural students more access to the
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university.
A natural concern that must be analyzed before implementing such policies is that since
the students taking the entrance exam to the university are a very selected sample (for
example, they have higher educated parents with higher income levels) despite decreasing
regional education inequalities, they might promote higher income inequalities among the
population. If that is the case, then efforts should be concentrated in investments that
increase the quality of rural public schools, increasing the rate of success of the rural students.
To deal with the problems mentioned in the last paragraph, we will first look at the
income distributions among applicants and entrants coming from urban and rural areas.
Figure 3.4 depicts income distribution between test applicants and university entrants that
come from rural areas.
As can be observed, among the rural students population the ones entering the university
come from more favored (richer) families. The same pattern can be observed when analyzing
test applicants and university entrants from urban areas. Figure 3.5 shows their income
distribution.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that students from both regions that enter the university come
from wealthier families. But comparing the income levels of the entrant students depicted in
Figure 3.2 we can observe that students coming from urban areas have higher income levels.
Therefore, affirmative action for rural areas would not only decrease regional education
inequalities, but also help fight the high income disparities observed in the Brazilian society.
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3.5.3 Urban and Rural Students by Major
The results so far suggest that students from rural areas perform better than (or as well as)
those from urban areas. However, the results presented so far hide key differences between
the two group of students. As shown by Sampaio (2011), students from rural areas face
bigger barriers to enter the university as they have lower entrance test scores, specially those
applying for high competitive majors. Capturing differences in rural and urban students by
college majors is an important consideration since differences in occupation is, by itself, an
important source of income inequality.
In Table 3.3 we present all the different majors offered by UFPE (a total of 80 majors)
and we rank them according the how competitive they are to get in.
Table 3.3 highlights another important characteristic of the Brazilian labor market. Ac-
cording to the 2009 Brazilian National Household Sample Survey (PNAD), the majors where
there is higher competition to get in match those majors where there is also high economic
returns from attending it (see also Alves and Pinto (2011)). Thus, if, for example, rural
and urban students enter different sets of majors, such behavior would create another im-
pediment to social mobility. In such a case, policies that increase college attendance for any
given group as suggested in the previous subsection, would be mostly effective in decreasing
regional and income inequality if they targeted the cohort of students that are only able to
attend the low return majors and increase their acceptance rates in the high competitive
ones as well. In Tables 3.4 and 3.5 we address these issues.
Table 3.4 shows the percentage of public, urban and rural students that enroll in the
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highest competitive majors at UFPE. As the model constructed in section 3.2 predicts, the
best ETS are obtained by the high ability students that come from urban areas. Thus, it
would not be surprising to find that the majority of students enrolled in high competitive
majors come from urban areas with few high ability rural students. This is exactly what we
observe in the table.
For example, from all students coming from public schools and that are attending the
Medicine major none come from an rural area. The same pattern can be observed for
majors such as Physiotherapy, Journalism and Computer Science, among others. From the
total public school students enrolled in the highest competitive majors an average of 7.3%
com from rural areas. Among the total available places in the freshman class, an average of
only 1.5% come from rural public schools.
Following the construction of Table 3.4, Table 3.5 shows the percentage of public, urban
and rural students that enroll in the lowest competitive majors at UFPE. This time the
model predicts that we should expect to find more rural students enrolled in these majors,
as they are easier to get in, along with their low ability urban colleagues.
We can now observe that out of the total public school students enrolled in each major
higher proportions come from rural areas. Overall, out of the total public school students,
an average of 8.4% come from rural areas. Also, from the total places offered in the lowest
competitive majors, 3.7% are filled with rural public school students. Thus, it appears that
the Brazilian higher educational system set up prevents rural students from enrolling in the
highest competitive (earning) majors.
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If the description of the model is correct, we should expect to find little (or no) GPA
differences among students enrolled in the highly competitive majors but higher differences
in performance for those enrolled in the lowest competitive majors. To observe these impli-
cations we split the sample for the high and low competitive majors and replicate the results
presented in Table 3.2. The new set of results are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
In Table 3.6 we present the results for the highly competitive majors. As can be observed,
differences in GPA among urban and rural students decrease in magnitude when compared
to the specifications where we use the full sample of students.
As implied by our model, the students who are able to enter the high competitive majors
are the high pre-college ability students from urban and rural areas and both groups are
likely to have similar GPA performance while at the university.
The low pre-college ability urban students as well as the the majority of the high pre-
college ability rural students enter the lowest competitive majors at UFPE. These majors
require lower ETS in order for a student to get accepted. In these majors we should expect
to find large GPA differences between rural and urban students, given the differences in pre-
college ability already mentioned. In Table 3.7 we present results for the lowest competitive
majors.
The results show a large difference between urban and rural students GPA and corrobo-
rate with the predictions obtained in the theoretical model.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we look at differences in GPA performance between students coming from
rural and urban areas in Brazil who ware granted access to the higher educational system.
Understanding how these students perform once they are granted access to the university is
important to help design better and more efficient ways of selecting students to enter the uni-
versity system and construction public policies to decrease regional educational inequalities
and overall income inequality in Brazil. The findings of the paper suggest that affirmative
actions that benefit rural students to enter the university (specially for the highest compet-
itive majors) are among the most effective by increasing efficiency at the universities and
helping fight educational inequalities among regions and decreasing income inequalities in
Brazil.
We use a data set of entrance test scores from the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
(UFPE), a major public university in Brazil, with follow-up information on the students who
ware granted access to it. The data contains detailed information on students’ background,
school characteristics as well as information about which school the student was enrolled
in when graduating from high school. It also includes information on which major each
students is enrolled and their GPA towards the course of college. This allows us to estimate
GPA differences among students coming from rural and urban areas. We find that students
coming from urban public schools score on average 0.34 standard deviations below their
rural counterparts. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence that those that have higher
conditional GPA’s are less affected by coming from an urban area, i.e., the top students in
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their classes, regardless of coming form an urban or an rural areas, perform about the same.
This evidence indicates that rural students with lower conditional GPA’s would benefit the
most from entering the higher educational system since they would benefit from future higher
wage rates, which would help decrease regional and income inequalities in the country and
would help increase overall university performance. We also show that policies that help
increase the number of public rural students in the university system, such as quotas, grade
increases, etc, would also help to decrease regional educational inequalities and help fight
the high income inequalities observed in Brazil. Lastly, we show that rural students do not
distribute evenly across the highest and the lowest competitive majors at the university,
which could be an important source of income inequality.
The results in this paper contribute to better understanding the higher educational system
in Brazil and raise a number of questions regarding its entrance requirements and suggest
ways to improve it. Questions regarding quotas in support of rural students, equality in
the educational system and implications of using some policy instruments can now be, if
not completely, partially addressed. It is also important to mention that using urban and
rural areas as basis of affirmative action may be easier to administrate than other criteria.
Ultimately, understanding these issues are important additions to help fight educational and
income inequalities in Brazil and help construct a better society.
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Table 3.3: Ratio of Applicants per Available Place by Major: UFPE (2005) Data
Highest Competitive Majors Lowest Competitive Majors
Ratio of Ratio of
Major Students Major Students
Gastronomy and Food Security 31.83 Biological Engineering (teacher credential) - UFRPE 7.23
Medicine 21.73 Chemistry (B.A.) 7.15
Law 20.97 Mathematics (teacher credential) 6.98
Publicity/Propaganda 20.53 Zootechny 6.98
Nursing 19.03 Biblioteconomy 6.89
Fisiotherapy 18.33 Normal Superior 6.88
Journalism 17.45 Mining Engineering 6.8
Radio-Television 16.77 Mechanical Engineering 6.56
Tourism 14.85 Biological Engineering (B.A.) 6.54
Biomedicine 13.6 Social Science (B.A.) - UFRPE 6.49
Physical education 13.58 Mathematics (teacher credential) - UFRPE 6.24
Phonoaudiology 13.15 Agricultural and Environmental Engineering 6.18
Psychology 12.2 Electrical Engineering 6.14
Business Administration 12.09 Music (teacher credential) 5.93
Computer Science 11.99 Fishing Engineering 5.87
Design 11.93 Agronomy 5.71
Hospitality Management 11.75 Production Engineering 5.7
Nutrition 11.4 Geography (B.A.) 5.69
Literature, Science and Arts 11.32 Geography (teacher credential) 5.65
Occupational therapy 11.27 Biological Engineering (teacher credential) 5.58
Dentistry 11.14 Civil Engineering 5.31
Social Services 10.84 Industrial Chemistry 5.15
History (teacher credential) - UFRPE 10.73 Chemical Engineering 5.08
History (B.A.) 9.91 Physics (teacher credential) - UFRPE 4.88
Performing Arts 9.63 Mathematics (B.A.) 4.83
Computer Engineering 9.6 Philosophy 4.75
Social Science (teacher credential) 9.57 Physics (B.A.) 4.73
Pharmacy 9.36 Domestic Economics 4.58
Accounting 9.33 Visual Arts 4.5
Biological Engineering (B.A.) - UFRPE 9.06 Physics (teacher credential) 4.5
Veterinary Medicine 8.75 Electrotechnical Engineering 4.41
Social Science (B.A.) 8.73 Biomedical Engineering 4.2
Pedagogy 8.62 Chemistry (teacher credential) - UFRPE 4.11
Architecture and Urbanism 8.48 Music (instrument) 4.07
Computer Science (teacher credential) - UFRPE 8.37 Forest Engineering 3.82
Secretary Studies 8.32 Statistics 3.8
Economics 8.27 Chemistry (teacher credential) 2.87
Visual Arts 7.83 Geology 2.73
Environmental Sciences 7.82 Music (chant) 2.4
Economics - UFRPE 7.61 Cartographic Engineering 1.9
Note: In 2005 the major of Gastronomy and Food Security was created by the university, thus,
in that year the competition was very high. This was not observed in the following years,
where Medicine was the highest competitive major. Normal Superior is a teacher credential
degree created by the government to give a university degree for primary and secondary school
teachers who did not have a university degree. Data source: UFPE 2005.
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Table 3.4: Percent of Students from Public Schools, Rural and Urban Areas for the Highest
Competitive Majors: UFPE (2005) Data
Major Available % Public % Public School % Available Places
Places School Urban Rural Public Urban Public Rural
Gastronomy and Food Security 40 22.5 77.8 22.2 17.5 5.0
Medicine 140 10.7 100.0 0.0 10.7 0.0
Law 190 12.6 95.8 4.2 12.1 0.5
Publicity/Propaganda 40 5.0 50.0 50.0 2.5 2.5
Nursing 80 20.0 75.0 25.0 15.0 5.0
Fisiotherapy 60 10.0 100.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Journalism 40 25.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 0.0
Radio-Television 30 30.0 100.0 0.0 30.0 0.0
Tourism 60 25.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 0.0
Biomedicine 100 17.0 94.1 5.9 16.0 1.0
Physical education 120 31.7 89.5 10.5 28.3 3.3
Phonoaudiology 20 15.0 100.0 0.0 15.0 0.0
Psychology 80 18.8 93.3 6.7 17.5 1.3
Business Administration 240 14.6 97.1 2.9 14.2 0.4
Computer Science 100 14.0 100.0 0.0 14.0 0.0
Design 60 16.7 100.0 0.0 16.7 0.0
Hospitality Management 20 10.0 100.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Nutrition 60 10.0 83.3 16.7 8.3 1.7
Literature, Science and Arts 120 34.2 97.6 2.4 33.3 0.8
Occupational therapy 30 10.0 100.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Dentistry 100 8.0 100.0 0.0 8.0 0.0
Social Services 120 42.5 90.2 9.8 38.3 4.2
History (teacher credential) - UFRPE 80 57.5 95.7 4.3 55.0 2.5
History (B.A.) 110 20.9 91.3 8.7 19.1 1.8
Performing Arts 30 16.7 60.0 40.0 10.0 6.7
Computer Engineering 50 10.0 100.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Social Science (teacher credential) 40 50.0 95.0 5.0 47.5 2.5
Pharmacy 80 17.5 85.7 14.3 15.0 2.5
Accounting 220 30.9 94.1 5.9 29.1 1.8
Biological Engineering (B.A.) - UFRPE 80 23.8 94.7 5.3 22.5 1.3
Veterinary Medicine 100 20.0 85.0 15.0 17.0 3.0
Social Science (B.A.) 60 26.7 93.8 6.3 25.0 1.7
Pedagogy 250 45.6 95.6 4.4 43.6 2.0
Architecture and Urbanism 100 12.0 100.0 0.0 12.0 0.0
Computer Science (teacher credential) - UFRPE 31 51.6 93.8 6.3 48.4 3.2
Secretary Studies 100 56.0 94.6 5.4 53.0 3.0
Economics 100 14.0 92.9 7.1 13.0 1.0
Visual Arts 30 23.3 100.0 0.0 23.3 0.0
Environmental Sciences 50 14.0 100.0 0.0 14.0 0.0
Average 86 22.9 92.7 7.3 21.4 1.5
Note: Data source: UFPE 2005.
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Table 3.5: Percent of Students from Public Schools, Rural and Urban Areas for the Lowest
Competitive Majors: UFPE (2005) Data
Major Available % Public % Public School % Available Places
Places School Urban Rural Public Urban Public Rural
Economics - UFRPE 80 32.5 100.0 0.0 32.5 0.0
Biological Engineering (teacher credential) - UFRPE 80 67.5 96.3 3.7 65.0 2.5
Mathematics (teacher credential) 40 50.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0
Zootechny 80 26.3 81.0 19.0 21.3 5.0
Biblioteconomy 35 31.4 90.9 9.1 28.6 2.9
Normal Superior 40 52.5 100.0 0.0 52.5 0.0
Mining Engineering 40 22.5 88.9 11.1 20.0 2.5
Mechanical Engineering 80 13.8 90.9 9.1 12.5 1.3
Biological Engineering (B.A.) 100 20.0 85.0 15.0 17.0 3.0
Social Science (B.A.) - UFRPE 80 52.5 100.0 0.0 52.5 0.0
Mathematics (teacher credential) - UFRPE 80 56.3 95.6 4.4 53.8 2.5
Agricultural and Environmental Engineering 60 30.0 94.4 5.6 28.3 1.7
Electrical Engineering 80 21.3 88.2 11.8 18.8 2.5
Music (teacher credential) 60 46.7 85.7 14.3 40.0 6.7
Fishing Engineering 60 18.3 90.9 9.1 16.7 1.7
Agronomy 160 38.8 85.5 14.5 33.1 5.6
Production Engineering 40 7.5 66.7 33.3 5.0 2.5
Geography (B.A.) 100 49.0 100.0 0.0 49.0 0.0
Geography (teacher credential) 80 66.3 94.3 5.7 62.5 3.8
Biological Engineering (teacher credential) 50 48.0 79.2 20.8 38.0 10.0
Civil Engineering 120 15.8 89.5 10.5 14.2 1.7
Industrial Chemistry 40 52.5 95.2 4.8 50.0 2.5
Chemical Engineering 90 31.1 96.4 3.6 30.0 1.1
Physics (teacher credential) - UFRPE 80 48.8 97.4 2.6 47.5 1.3
Philosophy 40 20.0 100.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
Physics (B.A.) 30 6.7 100.0 0.0 6.7 0.0
Domestic Economics 40 50.0 90.0 10.0 45.0 5.0
Visual Arts 20 15.0 100.0 0.0 15.0 0.0
Physics (teacher credential) 30 43.3 92.3 7.7 40.0 3.3
Electrotechnical Engineering 100 36.0 94.4 5.6 34.0 2.0
Biomedical Engineering 20 10.0 100.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
Chemistry (teacher credential) - UFRPE 80 60.0 100.0 0.0 60.0 0.0
Music (instrument) 9 66.7 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0
Forest Engineering 50 38.0 94.7 5.3 36.0 2.0
Chemistry (teacher credential) 30 53.3 81.3 18.8 43.3 10.0
Geology 38 34.2 92.3 7.7 31.6 2.6
Music (chant) 4 100.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Cartographic Engineering 30 43.3 92.3 7.7 40.0 3.3
Average 60 38.8 91.6 8.4 35.2 3.7
Note: Data source: UFPE 2005.
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Figure 3.1: Income Distribution of Applicants and Entrants: UFPE (2005) Data. Data
source: UFPE 2005.
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Figure 3.2: Income Distribution of Urban and Rural Entrants: UFPE (2005) Data. Data
source: UFPE 2005.
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Figure 3.3: Quantile regression estimates for the indicator variable urban: UFPE (2005)
Data. Dependent variable: first year GPA. The solid line corresponds to the quantile estimate
and the shaded area the 90% confidence interval. The dashed line represents the OLS estimate
and dotted lines its 90% confidence interval. Data source: UFPE 2005.
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Figure 3.4: Income Distribution of Urban and Rural Entrants: UFPE (2005) Data. Data
source: UFPE 2005.
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Figure 3.5: Income Distribution of Urban and Rural Entrants: UFPE (2005) Data. Data
source: UFPE 2005.
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Chapter 4
College Dropouts and Entrance Test
Scores: A Censored Quantile
Regression Approach
4.1 Introduction
High university dropout rates have become a major concern in many countries and have
attracted researchers’ attention over the last decades (see, for example, Tinto (1993); W. Nor-
ton (1989); Oosterbeek (1989) and Hartog, Pfann, and Ridder (1989)). Many of these papers
are devoted to analyzing the determinants of university dropouts, with specific attention
given to the estimation of the relationship between entrance test scores and the probability
of dropout. Obtaining correct estimates for the relationship between these two events is
not as simple as it may seem from a first view. For the US, which has been the most ana-
lyzed country in the world, many complications arise from the fact that not only the SAT
score determines acceptance in college education. Rothstein (2004), for example, analyzed
the correlation between SAT scores and college performance accounting for the fact that
SAT scores alone do not determine college acceptance. He showed that the usual methods
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used in the literature, that did not account for omitted variables in the selection process,
were overstating the selection-adjusted estimate obtained from his new omitted variables
estimator.
For Brazil, the situation is quite different. The admissions process and the institutional
set up of the university makes the identification of the parameter of interest much more
reliable. Three main advantages are responsible for that. First, all students are required to
choose their major before taking the exam and, once they have entered the university, they
are not allowed to switch majors. Secondly, once the student is enrolled at the university, the
curriculum is the same for all students, with very small flexibility allowed for those students
who are close to graduation. This is a big advantage compared to how the educational system
is organized in the US, in which students have great flexibility to choose the classes they
want to attend and the areas they want to major in. Hence, given each course offered at the
university varies significantly in terms of subject covered, average quality of students and
teaching staff, dropout rates, etc, the data allows us to add major fixed effects to account
for these differences. These fixed effects should capture any variation among courses, such
as selection of students with high entrance test scores into the most competitive majors,
and comparisons will be made within students enrolled in the same major and not between
majors.The third important difference is that acceptance is completely determined by the
entrance test score. Thus, we need not worry about any other selection bias arising from
unobserved variables that affect acceptance.
Hence, our main objective in this paper is to analyze the relationship between entrance
exam scores in Brazilian universities and their predictive power on the probability of college
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dropout. We start by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model and find that the perfor-
mance on the vestibular exam appears to be negatively related to the probability of dropout.
However, once major fixed effects are included in the equation to account for differences in
major’s characteristics and to prevent the comparison across students enrolled in different
majors, we find that the coefficient for entrance test scores (ETS) becomes positive, i.e.,
students who enrolled with high ETS are on average dropping out more than students who
enrolled with low ETS. This result is maintained even when other covariates, such as gender,
age, parents education and family income are included in the regression.
The results obtained from the Cox proportional hazard model do not allow one to observe
how the correlation between entrance test scores and dropout varies by the duration of
the university course. Thus, building on Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) regression quantile
methods, we use Portnoy’s (2003) technique to estimate the effect of the covariates over the
course of dropout timing in the presence of random censoring. Hence, we benefit from using
censored quantile regression to model university dropout and compare its result with the ones
obtained from traditional approaches that do not allow for intra quantile observations. We
obtain that a better performance in the entrance exam is correlated with a positive increase
in the probability of college dropout for the earlier quantiles (those below τ = 0.40), but
significantly decreases dropout probabilities for the latter quantiles. This observed crossover
effect could not be captured by the Cox proportional hazard model, where results indicated
that higher test scores increased the overall dropout probability.
After this introduction, the rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 de-
scribes the institutional background and presents the data used in the analysis. Section 4.3
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briefly describes the Cox proportional hazard model and presents its results. In section 4.4
we describe in detail the censored quantile regression model along with a discussion of its
estimates. Section 4.5 describes the mechanisms of university dropout. Finally, in section
4.6 we discuss the main implications of the analysis and present a few concluding remarks.
4.2 Data and Institutional Background
The dataset used in this paper comes from students who enter the Universidade Federal
de Pernambuco (UFPE), which is a major university that is located in the Northeast of
Brazil. UFPE is a public university which charges no tuition fees and the only requirement
for entering the universities’ undergraduate programs is an entrance exam, the vestibular,1
that must be taken by all candidates. The exam consists of two rounds and students are
required to choose their major before the first round. Candidates must take the following
subjects in the first round: Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Foreign Language, Chemistry,
Geography, Literature, History and Portuguese. The second round is taken only by those
students who scored a minimum required to pass in the first round. Final acceptance for
higher education depends not only on the final score obtained by the student, but also on
which major the student applied for. That is, obtaining a score of 80% might guarantee
acceptance in the Engineering College but not in the College of Law, for example.
A socioeconomic questionnaire collected in the application process provides rich and
detailed information on students’ family background, individual characteristics, and previous
1The Vestibular is a competitive examination and is the primary and widespread system used by Brazilian
universities to select their students. The exam usually takes place from October to January, right before the
start of school year in February.
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educational information, such as, for example, the type of secondary school (if private or
public) the student graduated from. The data used in the paper includes all students who
entered the university in the years of 2002, 2003 and 2004. There are about 3,500 students
accepted each year at the university, with 20% of these accepted for the rural segment of the
university,2 for which we do not have data on their academic performance at the university.
With this restriction, however, we are still left with 2,500-2,600 students per year, leading
to a total of 7,706 students in the sample. Besides having information on their entrance test
scores and socioeconomic background, we had access to all the available information related
to their performance in each course they took at the university. Hence, we were able to know
the exact moment they graduated or dropped out from higher education.
The admissions process and the institutional set up of the university makes our data
very useful in identifying the parameter we are interested in estimating. The three main
advantages are as follows: first, all students are required to choose their major before taking
the exam and, once they have entered the university, they are not allowed to switch majors.
If the decision is to switch, however, the student must dropout and take the entrance exam
again. Secondly, once the student is enrolled at the university, the curriculum is the same for
all students, with very small flexibility allowed for those students who are close to graduation.
This is a big advantage for the estimation technique compared to how the educational system
is organized in the US, in which students have great flexibility to choose the classes they
want to attend and the areas they want to major in. Hence, given each course offered at the
university varies significantly in terms of subject covered, average quality of students and
2This segment include courses like Fishery Engineering, Animal Science, Agronomy, among others.
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teaching staff, dropout rates, etc, the data allows us to add major fixed effects to equation
(4.1). These fixed effects should capture any difference between courses, like selection of
students with high entrance test scores for the most competitive majors, and comparisons
will be made within the groups of students enrolled in the same major and not between
majors.
Third, and most importantly, acceptance is completely determined by the entrance test
score. For the U.S., for example, Rothstein (2004) analyzed the correlation between SAT
scores and college performance accounting for the fact that SAT scores alone do not determine
college acceptance. He showed that the usual methods used in the literature, which did not
account for omitted variables in the selection process, were overstating the selection-adjusted
estimate obtained from his new omitted variables estimator. Hence, our institutional setup is
very different from the American educational setting, and this makes our estimation strategy
much more reliable and easier to implement.
4.2.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.1. Among
the variables used in the analysis we included controls for student background characteristics
(age, major enrolled and last term observed attending the university, among others) and
family background variables, such as parents income and educational levels.
As can be observed from Table 4.1, the average test score among all students is about
5.9 on a scale from 0 to 10. From the total sample, about 30% have dropped out of the
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university and, on average, students lasted until the 9th semester in college.3 As for entrance
age, we observe that there is a wide range among university entrants. Students entering the
university span a range of 15 to 55 years of age, but entrants average age is about 19
years old. They also take more than one vestibular exam on average, before being granted
access to UFPE. Among the students in the university, we observe that the majority have
better educated mothers (with high school and college degrees) and that they come from
less wealthier families (those earning less than 10 times the minimum wage rate).
In Table 4.2 we present a description of the situation of every student when they ware
last observed by the university for the three years used in our sample. The table provides a
good description of the number of students that graduated on time and those that finished
college later, as well as those that dropped out and did not acquire a college degree.
As observed, the majority of students tend to graduate on time (graduating around the
fourth or fifth year of schooling). For those graduating at a latter date, the majority delay
graduation by no more than one year. Among those that drop out of college, we observe
that there is a high rate of drop out in the beginning of their course of study (first two years
of school), decreasing afterwards and increasing again about two years after the desired
graduation year. Finally, the table also highlights the high amount of students that drop
out of the university compared to all university entrants.
3In Brazil, an undergraduate course or program, where an Bachelor’s Degree is awarded, generally take
four to six years depending on the specific major.
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4.3 Cox Proportional Hazard Model
We start by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model (see Cox (1972)) to analyze
how entrance test scores and the decision to dropout from college are related. Consider the
following model:
λ(t|ETSi, xi) = λ0(t) · exp(ETSTi β + xTi δ) (4.1)
where δ is vector of parameters, ETSi is students entrance test score, xi is a vector of student
characteristics, and λ0(t) is a baseline hazard function for the set of conditions where x
T
i = 0
and ETSTi = 0. The parameter of interest is given by β and captures how entrance test
scores are related to the probability of dropout at time t, λ(t|ETSi, xi).
The model makes no assumption whatsoever about the form of λ0(t), allowing it be
arbitrary, but assumes a parametric form for the effect of the predictors on the dropout
hazard. Also, since the baseline hazard function is independent of the vectors of covariates,
the parameters of the model will only shift the hazard function up or down. Thus, covariates
must either increase the hazard over the whole time scale, if the estimated coefficient is
positive, or decrease it, if it is negative.
Given our interest is on identifying the relationship between entrance test scores and the
probability of dropout, we add additional controls, captured in xi, which include age when
entering the university, the number of exams taken before being accepted at the university,
parents’ educational background and monthly family income. Controlling for the number of
exams taken before entering the university is important since many students are not admitted
at UFPE right after they finish secondary schooling. For example, about 25% of all students
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applying each year that were never admitted at UFPE have taken at least two exams before.
This is because the university offers only 3,500 spots and there are over 50,000 candidates
each year. Hence, many students try for many years to earn a spot at the university. As
discussed above, we include major fixed effects to control for any selection issues that arise
from differences in acceptance rates, graduation rates, as well as variables related to labor
market outcomes that might affects students decision to apply for a given major.
Table 4.3 presents the coefficients for the entrance test score variable estimated via the
proportional hazard model. We decided to present the relative risk or the hazard ratio, which
is an estimate of the ratio of the hazard rate in the treated versus the control group. The
relative risk for a subject with a set of predictors X? compared to a subject with a set of
predictors X is given by
HR =
λ0(t) · exp(X?βˆ)
λ0(t) · exp(Xβˆ)
= exp((X? −X)βˆ) = exp(βˆ). (4.2)
We start by specifying a model in which only the test score variable is included in the
equation. As can be observed from Table 4.3, the performance on the vestibular exam appears
to be negatively related to the probability of dropout, however, the estimated parameter is
not statistically different from zero. In column 2 we include controls for the year the student
enrolled at the university. This variable is important to control for due to the fact that
we observe students academic history only until 2011, which means that a student who
enrolled in 2002 is observed for 10 years, whereas a student who entered college in 2004 is
observed only for 8 years. If dropout rates vary significantly throughout college semesters,
then including this year effect is necessary. The estimated coefficient is negative, as expected,
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but larger than the value presented in column 1 and statistically different from zero. This
implies that students who enrolled with low entrance test scores dropout with a higher
probability when compared to students that enrolled with high entrance scores. This result,
however, compares students enrolled in different majors and may reflect only selection of the
best students enrolled in more competitive majors that require high entrance test scores for
admittance. For example, medicine presents the lowest dropout rate (about 2%) but is the
most competitive major to get admitted to (requiring an entrance test score above 80%),
while statistics present high dropout rates (about 51%) but very low minimum entrance test
scores (about 36%).
To account for differences among courses, we add course fixed effects in column 3. By
comparing only students enrolled in the same course, we obtain that the coefficient for
ETS becomes positive, i.e., students who enrolled with high ETS are on average dropping
more than students who enrolled with low ETS. This result is maintained even when other
covariates, such as gender, age, parents education and family income are included in the
regression (column 4).
The downside of using Cox’s proportional hazard model to analyze the effects of entrance
performance on dropouts is that it does not allow us to observe how covariates vary in time.
Since the baseline hazard function λ0 is non-negative, it only allows for the estimates to be
either entirely above the horizontal “effect equals zero” axis or entirely below it. The model
forbids the possibility that treatments may increase the hazard for a time and then decrease
it. Such crossovers are, however, sometimes quite plausible, and an advantage of the quantile
regression approach is that they are more easily revealed. In the next section we introduce
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and explore censored quantile regression models.
4.4 Censored Quantile Regression Model
4.4.1 Theoretical Development
Quantile regression methods were first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and
offer a mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median function, and the full
range of other conditional quantile functions. Thus, it provides a more complete statistical
analysis on how the variable of interest varies among the different quantiles. In such a way,
we can observe how exam performance affects the probability of dropping out of college
across the time quantiles. This is an important effect to capture since the probability of
dropout might vary significantly over a student’s college lifetime.
In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the application of quantile regression
techniques to survival analysis (See Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006), Anna (1997), Koenker
and Bilias (2001) and Koenker and Geling (2001)). The main difference encountered across
studies in the literature is the nature of the data, whether censored or uncensored. When the
setup uses uncensored data, all failure times must be known for all the observations, and the
model can be simply estimated by least squares, or using simple quantile regression methods.
However, when random censoring is present, that is, not all failure times are known, things
get trickier and new estimation approaches must be utilized. Since those students who did
not dropout of college are considered as censored observations, we must proceed with the
latter techniques.
The first work dealing with censored quantile regressions appears in the seminal paper
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of Powell (1986). In his approach he uses a linear model and assumes that all observations
cannot be observed above a certain time C, also known to the literature as “fixed censoring”.
Consider a general model, Yˆi = min{C, xTi β + ui}. For τ ∈ [0, 1], define
ρτ (u) = u(τ − I(u < 0)) (4.3)
where I(·) is an indicator variable. Powell (1986) show that the regression quantile estimator,
βˆ(τ), is the β that minimizes the objective function
r(β) =
n∑
i=1
ρτ (Yi −min{C, xTi β}) (4.4)
The linear characteristic of the function poses serious estimation problems. The objective
function, r(β) is no longer convex, so local optimization methods may fail to find a global
minimum.
Another problem is that in some applications, we might not be able to observe a censoring
time for all observations. In fact, we can only observe a censoring time for the observations
that are, by themselves, censored. Such setup is known as “random censoring”. Trying
to deal with the problem of random censoring, especially related to medical studies where
contact with some individuals will be lost before their death, Kaplan and Meier (1958)
propose estimating survival data where random censoring is present using a non-parametric
approach. Defining the probability of surviving time t as
P (t) =
Nt −Dt
Nt
(4.5)
where Nt is the total number of survivors less the number of losses (censored cases) at time t
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and Dt the number of deaths at time t; the probability of surviving passed t periods is given
by the product of the conditional probability of surviving all past periods and t.4 Thus, we
can define S(t) as the probability of surviving more than t periods, and rewrite it as
Sˆ(t) =
∏
i≤t
Ni −Di
Ni
(4.6)
As suggested by Efron (1967), one could interpret Sˆ as shifting mass (reweighting) of the
censored observations to the noncensored observation to the right. Nonetheless, the Kaplan-
Meier estimator relies on calculating the probabilities of surviving for a certain period and
reweighing data mass forward, in other words, the method relies on data binning. Since
the probabilities of survival may depend on other covariates as well, data binning becomes
unreliable as the number of covariates grow.
Based on the Kaplan-Meier reweighing scheme, Portnoy (2003) argued that the mass at
a given C could be redistributed to any point above all the data. This is true because the
empirical quantile function at any given point depends only on the sign of the residuals.
That idea allowed for application of the reweighing scheme to be applied to more general
regression analysis problems.
The issue, than, becomes on how to estimate the censoring probability for each censored
observation. Portnoy (2003) argued that this could be achieved by finding a value of τˆi at
which the quantile function, xTi βˆ(τ), crosses the censoring time, C.
5 Thus, for each censored
4It is only those surviving cases that are still being observed (have not yet been censored) that are “at
risk” of an (observed) death.
5τˆi is the largest τ for which the residual at C is positive. Formally, it is defined by
τˆi = max
τ
{xTi βˆ(τ) < C}
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observation, given τˆi, weights can be defined for τ > τˆi as
wi(τ) =
τ − τˆi
1− τˆi (4.7)
These weights can be used to redefine the quantile regression problem where “pseudo-
observations” at (xi, C) are weighted by wi(τ) and those at (xi,+∞) weighted by (1−wi(τ)).
To obtain the censored quartile regression estimates for each quantile he solves the fol-
lowing minimization problem
βˆ(τ) = arg min
β
∑
i/∈K(τ)
ρτ (Yi − xTi β) +
∑
i∈K(τ)
{
wi(τ)ρτ (C − xTi β)
+ (1− wi(τ))ρτ (Y+∞ − xTi β)
}
(4.8)
where K(τ) denotes the set of censored observations encountered up to τ .
4.4.2 Empirical Results
As mentioned in the previous section, by employing quantile regression methods to an-
alyze how entrance test scores performance affects college dropout rates, we are able to
observe how the effects vary across time, thus allowing for a better understanding of college
dropouts. The technique developed by Portnoy (2003) allows us to combine survival analysis
techniques, where data censoring is present, to the quantile regression techniques developed
by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the censored quantile regression
results. To compare with the Cox proportional hazard model estimates, we plot the results
presented in Table 4.3. The solid lines in each of the plots, with no confidence bands, indi-
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cates the estimated conditional quantile “effects” implied by the estimated Cox model (see
Koenker and Geling (2001) for details on how this is constructed). The vertical axis plots
the effects of exam performance on college dropout rates, where positive effects indicate that
the time before college dropout is increased, and the horizontal axis depicts the different
time quantiles. The estimates are presented by the solid line contained in the gray areas,
where the latter indicate a 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are computed using a
xy-pair bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
In Figure 4.1 we depict the results for the model where no controls are included. As can
be observed, for the lower conditional time quantiles, better performance in the entrance
exam decreases the probability of college dropout. As we move along the time quantiles,
the effect becomes negative for the upper conditional quantiles. Overall, effects are not
distinguishable from zero.
When we include the full set of controls, specifically controls for the different majors,
results completely change over the different quantiles. Figure 4.2 depicts the results where
the full set of controls are included. One can observe a better performance in the entrance
exam increases the probability of college dropouts for the earlier quantiles (those below
τ = 0.40), but significantly decreases dropout probabilities for the latter quantiles. This
observed crossover effect could not be captured by the Cox proportional hazard model,
where results indicated that higher test scores increased the overall dropout probability.
These results are consistent with past findings where positive correlations between en-
trance test scores and probability of college dropout are found. For example, see Guimara˜es,
Sampaio, and Sampaio (2010). The intuition behind the observed high dropout probabilities
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following high entrance exam performance arises from the fact that high ability students,
given the recognition of a wrong career choice, have a lower cost implicitly defined by their
higher probability of being accepted for a different major on next years’ exam, and its dis-
cussed in the following section.
4.5 Mechanisms of Dropout
The results presented so far show a positive correlation between students entrance test
scores and university dropout rates. Furthermore, we observe that students entering the
university with better performance are more likely to dropout in the early stages (during
the first four semesters). What is happening to these students?, Where are they going after
dropping out? and more importantly, who is going where?, are questions that remain to be
answered.
To address some of these questions we first look at the dropout rates by university majors.
In Table 4.4 we show the rate of evasion for each university major in our sample.
At a first glance, Table 4.4 shows the high rates of evasion of the Brazilian university,
specially for majors in exact sciences, i.e., the Engineering majors. Also, we can observe
lower rates of dropouts for majors within Health Sciences. Given very different evasion rates
between these major groups, one might wonder how competitive they are to get accepted to.
In Figure 4.3 we plot the cutoff entrance score and evasion rates for the different majors.
A first look at Figure 4.3 shows an apparent negative relationship between cutoff entrance
score and dropout rates. The more competitive the major is to be accepted to, the lower is
the observed evasion rate. Thus, it appears that the students, despite having entered with
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high entrance scores in each major, are mostly dropping out of the less competitive ones.
But where are these students going after dropping out of college? To answer this question
we look at the students that evaded college in the first two years and observe if they took
the university entrance exam in the subsequent year. We find that 34% of the students who
dropped out retake the entrance exam. Furthermore, those retaking the entrance exam are
among those who obtained the highest ETS in the previous year’s exam. Thus, it appears
that the high ability students dropout of the less competitive majors to try to enter a different
major in a subsequent year given they have lower costs implicitly defined by their higher
probability of being accepted for a different major on next years’ exam.
4.6 Implications and Concluding Remarks
Our main objective in this paper is to analyze the relationship between entrance exams
in Brazilian universities and its predictive power on the probability of college dropout. We
estimated a Cox proportional hazard model and found that the performance on the vestibular
exam appears to be negatively related to the probability of dropout. However, once major
fixed effects are included in the equation to account for differences in majors’ characteristics
and to avoid comparing students enrolled in different majors, we find that the coefficient for
ETS becomes positive, i.e., students who enrolled with high ETS are on average dropping
out more than students who enrolled with low ETS. This result is maintained even when
other covariates, such as gender, age, parents education and family income are included in
the regression.
The results obtained from the Cox proportional hazard model do not allow one to observe
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how the correlation between entrance test scores and dropout vary within the course of the
graduation time. Thus, building up on Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) regression quantile
methods, we use Portnoy’s (2003) technique to estimate the effect of the covariates over the
course of dropout timing in the presence of random censoring. Hence, we benefit from using
censored quantile regression to model university dropout and compare its result with the ones
obtained from traditional approaches that do not allow for intra quantile observations. We
obtain that a better performance in the entrance exam is correlated with a positive increase
in the probability of college dropout for the earlier quantiles (those below τ = 0.40), but
significantly decreases dropout probabilities for the latter quantiles. This observed crossover
effect could not be captured by the Cox proportional hazard model, where results indicated
that higher test scores increased the overall dropout probability.
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Table 4.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Model: UFPE (2002-03-04) Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entrance Score −0.022 −0.085∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.038) (0.038)
exp(β) 0.978 0.918 1.098 1.066
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Major Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Other controls No No No Yes
N. of observ. 7, 706 7, 706 7, 706 7, 706
Note: Other controls include age, family (monthly) income, parents educational levels and the
number of Vestibular exams taken before entering college. Standard Errors are presented in
parenthesis. ∗∗∗p<0.01. ∗∗p<0.05. ∗p<0.10. Data source: UFPE 2002, 2003 and 2004.
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Table 4.4: Rate of Evasion by Major: UFPE (2002-03-04) Data
Major 2002 2003 2004 Average
Mining Engineering 0.696 0.794 0.808 0.766
Electrical Engineering 0.712 0.766 0.648 0.709
Civil Engineering 0.587 0.656 0.677 0.640
Mechanical Engineering 0.662 0.563 0.682 0.636
Chemical Engineering 0.581 0.612 0.649 0.614
Electrotechnical Engineering 0.460 0.563 0.554 0.526
Music 0.563 0.482 0.449 0.498
Computer Engineering 0.512 0.391 0.571 0.492
Architecture and Urbanism 0.417 0.341 0.414 0.390
Accounting 0.353 0.387 0.394 0.378
History 0.321 0.375 0.372 0.356
Literature, Science and Arts 0.296 0.383 0.356 0.345
Tourism 0.365 0.268 0.389 0.341
Environmental Sciences 0.351 0.349 0.295 0.332
Biological Engineering 0.333 0.345 0.267 0.315
Business Administration 0.282 0.315 0.337 0.311
Physical education 0.189 0.327 0.324 0.280
Pedagogy 0.270 0.216 0.271 0.252
Occupational therapy 0.217 0.138 0.333 0.230
Computer Science 0.291 0.194 0.173 0.219
Psychology 0.206 0.157 0.182 0.182
Social Services 0.154 0.153 0.178 0.162
Fisiotherapy 0.170 0.127 0.170 0.156
Secretary Studies 0.170 0.088 0.198 0.152
Dentistry 0.154 0.125 0.175 0.151
Biomedicine 0.127 0.153 0.141 0.140
Pharmacy 0.156 0.111 0.134 0.134
Law 0.123 0.134 0.101 0.119
Nursing 0.065 0.095 0.119 0.093
Nutrition 0.120 0.074 0.042 0.079
Note: Data source: UFPE 2002, 2003 and 2004.
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Figure 4.1: Conditional Quantile Effects on Time to Dropout: UFPE (2002-03-04) Data.
Data source: UFPE 2002, 2003 and 2004.
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Figure 4.2: Conditional Quantile Effects on Time to Dropout: UFPE (2002-03-04) Data.
Data source: UFPE 2002, 2003 and 2004.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Brazil’s educational institutions have experienced huge changes in recent years where
new approaches have been proposed (for example, race quotas) in order to guarantee wider
acceptance rates to the university system. However, the percentage of the population that
have access to higher education is still very low and inequalities in the acceptance process
still present a problem. For example, students coming from urban and rural areas of the
country face different barriers to acquiring a college degree. Understanding what are the
barriers faced by these students in acquiring higher education is important for determining
which policies should be the focus of the government so that all students have the same
opportunity, regardless of family and school characteristics and geographical location. This
dissertation examines rural and urban students throughout the course of their college appli-
cation process and their university career (for those who have successfully entered college) to
better understand the educational system in Brazil and to propose new ways to help improve
it.
I use a data set from the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), a major public
university in Brazil. The data contains detailed information on students’ background, school
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characteristics as well as information about which school the student was enrolled in when
graduating from high school. It also includes information on which major each students is
enrolled and their GPA towards the course of college (for those who successfully entered
the university). The data allow me to estimate test score differences among students re-
siding in rural and urban areas when taking the university entrance examination, estimate
GPA differences among students coming from rural and urban areas while in the course of
their college degree and to analyze the relationship between entrance exam scores and their
predictive power on the probability of college dropout.
I find that students coming from urban public schools score on average 0.074 standard de-
viations above their rural counterparts (on the entrance exam). This represents a significant
difference in acceptance rates for the rural students. For example, when looking at the cutoff
entrance scores of all majors, increasing rural students’ grades by 0.074 standard deviation
would increase the number of rural students accepted to the university by 13.34%. The find-
ings also suggest that the underlying cause of such scores disparities appears to be the poor
quality of schools, especially the public schools located in rural areas. For the students who
ware able to enter the university, I find that those coming from urban public schools score
on average 0.34 standard deviations below their rural counterparts (in terms of students’
GPA). Therefore, rural students that enter the university seem to overcome their entrance
disadvantage. Furthermore, I find suggestive evidence that those that have higher condi-
tional GPA’s are less affected by coming from an urban area, i.e., the top students in their
classes, regardless of coming form an urban or an rural areas, perform about the same. This
evidence indicates that rural students with lower conditional GPA’s would benefit the most
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from entering the higher educational system since they would benefit from future higher wage
rates, which would help decrease regional and income inequalities in the country and would
help increase overall university performance. Lastly, I obtain that a better performance in
the entrance exam is correlated with a positive increase in the probability of college dropout
for the earlier semester quantiles, but significantly decreases dropout probabilities for the
later quantiles.
The results obtained in this dissertation contribute to better understanding the educa-
tional system in Brazil and raise a number of interesting questions regarding its entrance
requirements and curricula organization, and suggest ways to improve it. For example,
questions regarding quotas in support of rural students, equality in the educational system
and implications of using some policy instruments can now be, if not completely, partially
addressed. It is also important to mention that using urban and rural areas as basis of affir-
mative action may be easier to administrate than other criteria. Another important problem
of the higher educational public institutions is that they have very strict policies ruling stu-
dent transfers between majors. For example, those entering the Engineering College are
unable to transfer to other majors, if they wish to do so. The main implication is that those
wishing to transfer between majors are forced to drop out of college and retake the university
entrance examination. Such practice only generates inefficiencies (both in cost and time) to
the public system. Ultimately, understanding these issues are important additions to help
fight educational and income inequalities in Brazil and help construct a better society.
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Appendix A
Control Variables
This section closely follows the discussion given by Angrist and Pischke (2008) on control
variables. I start by showing the negative consequences of including bad control variables.
Then, I discuss the improvements of including good controls.
Suppose that we are interested in estimating the effect of having a college degree on
earnings. Since wage is also determined by the type of job one is enrolled in, it would seem
plausible to control for work type in an attempt to clean these effects on the variable of
interest. To do that, I would estimate the following model,
wagei = β0 + β1 · collegei + β2 · work typei + εi, (A.1)
where wagei is workers wage, collegei is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the worker has a
college degree and 0 otherwise and work typei an indicator variable equal to 1 if the worker
is enrolled in a high paying job and 0 if enrolled in a low paying job.
Since having a college degree affects both wage levels and the type of job a worker is
enrolled in, I can estimate causal effects of having a college degree on wages and work type
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as the following:
E[wagei|collegei = 1]− E[wagei|collegei = 0] = E[wage1i − wage0i] (A.2)
E[work typei|collegei = 1] − E[work typei|collegei = 0]
= E[work type1i − work type0i] (A.3)
To illustrate the problem of controlling for work typei, let’s look at the effects of having
college degree on wages for those enrolled in high paying jobs only. The difference in worker’s
wages of those with a college degree becomes:
E[wagei|collegei = 1, work typei = 1]− E[wagei|collegei = 0, work typei = 1]
= E[wage1i|collegei = 1, work type1i = 1]
−E[wage0i|collegei = 0, work type0i = 1]
= E[wage1i|work type1i = 1]− E[wage0i|work type0i = 1] (A.4)
Finally, adding and subtracting E[wage0i|work type1i = 1] from equation A.4 yields:
E[wage1i − wage0i|work type1i = 1] + E[wage0i|work type1i = 1]
− E[wage0i|work type0i = 1] (A.5)
The first term of equation A.5 captures the causal effect of interest but the second and
third terms capture the selection bias introduced when controlling for the outcome variable.
The discussion presented above depicts the problems of using bad variables as controls. Let’s
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now turn to the case where the inclusion of variables that are affected by the coefficient of
interest can, actually, improve estimates, which is the case of the ENEM variable.
Suppose now that the interest is to estimate the effects of schooling on wages. In an ideal
situation, since wages are affected by students ability (presumably a student with higher
ability will make more effort and get a better salary), it would be important to control for
an ability term collected before schooling decisions are taken. In such a case, the model of
interest would be the following:
wagei = γ0 + γ1 · schoolingi + γ2 · abilityi + εi, (A.6)
where wagei is students wage, schoolingi captures students schooling levels and abilityi
measure students cognitive ability.
In the absence of data on ability measures prior to schooling decision, let’s use another
variable that proxies ability but that is measured after schooling decisions are taken (for
example, the ENEM exam variable in the urban/rural framework). In such a case, the new
ability measure is defined as:
ability latei = α0 + α1 · schoolingi + α2 · abilityi (A.7)
Substituting the observed late ability measure for ability in equation A.6 yields:
wagei =
(
γ0 − γ2α0
α2
)
+
(
γ1 − γ2α1
α2
)
· schoolingi + γ2
α2
· ability latei + εi, (A.8)
Since γ2, α1 and α2 are all positive, the coefficient of interest, i.e., the schooling coefficient,
will, actually, be below the true schooling effect on wages.
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Lastly, it is important to notice that even if the coefficient estimated is not the true
schooling effect on wages, the new estimates might be better than when no ability control is
used in the wage model.
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Appendix B
Proofs
Combining household’s consumption in periods 1 and 2, child’s probability of passing the
university entrance exam and household’s utility function yields the household’s maximiza-
tion problem depicted in equation (3.11):
max
T∈{0,1}
Y + (1− T )Yl + γ [Y + (1− p(·))Yl + p(·)Yh] (B.1)
B.1 Proposition 2: The optimal educational time allocation (T )
invested in students that have high pre-college ability, re-
gardless of the area that they reside, is T ∗ = 1, given Yh is
sufficiently large.
Maximizing equation B.1 with respect to T for high pre-college ability students that
come from urban and rural areas yields the optimal educational investment which maximizes
household’s utility. To prove proposition 2, we can construct the optimal investment in T
for each situation [(δu, qh), (δr, qh)] by observing which choices of T leads the household to
the highest utility. Let’s begin with the first case:
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(δu, qh):
If T = 1 the household level of utility will be equal to:
U(δu, qh, T = 1) = Y + γY + γYh (B.2)
and if T = 0 it will be equal to:
U(δu, qh, T = 0) = Y + Yl + γY + γYl (B.3)
The household will invest in education if U(δu, qh, T = 1) > U(δu, qh, T = 0). Which in
turn requires that
Yh > Yl
(1 + γ)
γ
(B.4)
As can be observed in equation B.4, the household representative will only invest in
child’s education if Yh is sufficiently high compared to Yl. Furthermore, household’s that
care more about the future will require less difference between the high skilled wage (Yh)
and the low skilled wage (Yl) in order to make investments.
(δr, qh):
The construction of household utility levels for the two different investments situation for
high pre-college ability rural students closely follows the previous case, where the household
invests in child’s education only if
Yh > Yl
(1 + γ)
γ
(B.5)
Students with high pre-college ability levels will receive educational investments given
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there is sufficiently high income differentials between low skilled and high skilled wages,
regardless of coming form urban or rural areas.
B.2 Proposition 3: The optimal educational time allocation (T )
invested in students that have low pre-college ability and that
come from rural areas is T ∗ = 0.
To prove proposition 3 we will follow the proof of proposition 2 and construct the two
utility levels for when T = 0 and T = 1 and observe which decision yields the highest utility
level, thus, revealing the optimal decision for the household. The utility under the different
educational investment situations for the rural, low pre-college ability students is:
(δr, ql):
If T = 1,
U(δr, ql, T = 1) = Y + γY + γYl (B.6)
and if T = 0,
U(δr, ql, T = 0) = Y + Yl + γY + γYl (B.7)
Comparing both utility levels one can observe that utility under no investment (U(δr,ql,T =
0)) is higher. Therefore, household’s will not make educational investments on students
coming from rural areas and that have low pre-college ability. Thus, they will not attend a
university.
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B.3 Proposition 4: The optimal educational time allocation (T )
invested in students that have low pre-college ability and that
come from urban areas is increasing in γ and K.
We will again use equation B.1 to construct utility levels for when investments are made
and when the household representative do not invest in their children’s education. By com-
paring both utility levels we will be able to determine household’s optimal behavior towards
urban, low pre-college ability students.
(δu, ql):
If T = 1,
U(δu, ql, T = 1) = Y + γY + γ
[
1−
(
K − (αh + βh)
K
)]
Yl
+γ
[(
K − (αh + βh)
K
)]
Yh (B.8)
and if T = 0,
U(δu, ql, T = 0) = Y + Yl + γY + γYl (B.9)
Investments will occur when U(δu, ql, T = 1) > U(δu, ql, T = 0). The condition requires
that (
αh + βh
K
)
(Yl − Yh) + Yh > Yl
(
1 + γ
γ
)
(B.10)
First, note that there are three components that play an important role for equation B.10
to be satisfied, Yh, γ and
(
αh+βh
K
)
. Household’s with higher discount factor are more likely
to invest in education. Also, a higher skilled wage (Yh) will also increase the likelihood of
educational investments. Lastly, as the number of candidates admitted to college increase
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household’s will have more incentives to make investments in education. Therefore, at least
some urban students with low pre-college ability will receive educational investments and
will enter college education.
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